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INTRODUCTION 
Every time legislators and regulators adopt a legal change, they must 
decide whether to provide actors that are negatively affected by the new 
regime with some form of transition relief.  For example, when lawmakers 
decide to adopt more demanding pollution restrictions, should they 
grandfather existing plants so that these plants will (at least temporarily) be 
exempted from the new requirements?  Or should they require existing 
plants to immediately comply with the new regulations even if doing so 
would prove very costly?  Every time environmental laws and regulations 
are made more stringent, one must determine how existing actors should be 
required to respond.  The appropriate level of transition relief to grant, if 
any, is one of the most salient issues in U.S. regulatory policy, particularly 
in light of two looming concerns: the threat of global warming, which is 
likely to lead to significant new regulation, and the ongoing economic 
crisis, which will create pressure to reduce the burden of regulatory policies 
on private actors. 
As the experience under the Clean Air Act demonstrates, the efficacy 
of new regulations often depends upon the transition relief that is afforded 
to existing actors.  When the transition relief is too generous, existing plants 
continue to operate and no new plants (or few new plants) come into 
existence.  Indeed, as a result of the very generous grandfathering afforded 
to existing plants under the Clean Air Act, very few new electric utilities 
have been built in the U.S.,1 and thus the stringent standards adopted for 
new plants have not had their intended effect. 
This Article’s principal contribution to regulatory policy is to show the 
deep flaw in the standard academic approach to setting optimal regulatory 
standards, which proceeds in two steps: (1) selecting the new standard 
solely by reference to new sources and (2) choosing the transition relief in 
light of that new source standard.  This approach often yields a suboptimal 
result because there may be no new sources to meet the stringent standard, 
rendering the new standard entirely meaningless.  This Article demonstrates 
that the socially optimal approach is to jointly determine the new source 
 
1  42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1)–(2), (b)(1)(B) (2006) (providing that stringent federal performance 
standards only apply to “new sources” of air pollution); see also, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard 
L. Revesz, Grandfathering and Environmental Regulation: The Law and Economics of ew Source 
Review, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1677, 1717–18 (2007) (“The early Clean Air Act legislative history reflects 
a compromise to accept an extension of existing plants’ lives in exchange for the application of very 
strict standards to the new plants that would replace them in the future.  More than a third of a century 
after that compromise was struck, many of the plants that were in existence then remain in service 
now—far beyond the retirement date that most initially expected, even taking into account the 
introduction of life-extending differential regulatory standards.” (footnote omitted)). 
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standard and the transition rule.  This Article also challenges the main 
public choice justification for providing transition relief: while 
accompanying new regulations with transition relief may make it easier for 
political actors to adopt new regulations in the first place, transition relief 
may also render the new regulations entirely ineffective such that it would 
be preferable to maintain the status quo. 
The appropriate scope of transition relief has been discussed 
extensively in the academic literature, as has the question of whether 
transition relief is desirable at all.2  The position now referred to as the “old 
view” favors transition relief because existing actors have relied on the 
previous laws in ordering their affairs and hence should be granted some 
time to adjust to new laws.3  What is now referred to as the “new view” 
argues against transition relief on the ground that it can discourage actors 
from anticipating socially desirable legal changes.4  The new view was first 
articulated by Michael Graetz in the tax context5 and Louis Kaplow in the 
regulatory context.6  While the new view has been very influential, it has 
recently been challenged by Steven Shavell.7  Thus, Shavell and Kaplow—
colleagues at Harvard Law School and frequent coauthors8—have taken 
different positions on the subject of optimal transition relief.  While Kaplow 
contends that transition relief is generally undesirable because it gives 
 
2  See, e.g., DANIEL SHAVIRO, WHEN RULES CHANGE: AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF 
TRANSITION RELIEF AND RETROACTIVITY (2000); Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of 
Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47 (1977); Louis Kaplow, An Economic 
Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509 (1986); Steven Shavell, On Optimal Legal Change, 
Past Behavior, and Grandfathering, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 37 (2008). 
3  See, e.g., Harold M. Hochman, Rule Change and Transitional Equity, in REDISTRIBUTION 
THROUGH PUBLIC CHOICE 320, 324 (H. Hochman & G. Peterson eds., 1974); Frank I. Michelman, 
Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 
HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1219, 1224 (1967).  This argument has also been made in the tax context.  See, 
e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 187–88 (1977); Comm. on 
Tax Policy, N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Retroactivity of Tax Legislation, 29 TAX LAW. 21, 23, 27–28 (1975); 
Note, Setting Effective Dates for Tax Legislation: A Rule of Prospectivity, 84 HARV. L. REV. 436, 439 
(1970). 
4  See, e.g., SHAVIRO, supra note 2, at 2–3; Kaplow, supra note 2, at 531; Graetz, supra note 2, at 
64–66, 85. 
5  Graetz, supra note 2. 
6  Kaplow, supra note 2. 
7  Shavell, supra note 2. 
8  See, e.g., LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, CONTRACTING (2004); LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN 
SHAVELL, DECISION ANALYSIS, GAME THEORY, AND INFORMATION (2004); LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN 
SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of 
Law, in 4 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1661 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 2002); 
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare: otes on the Pareto Principle, Preferences, 
and Distributive Justice, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 331 (2003); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Moral Rules, 
the Moral Sentiments, and Behavior: Toward a Theory of an Optimal Moral System, 115 J. POL. ECON. 
494 (2007); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, otions of Fairness Versus the Pareto Principle: On the 
Role of Logical Consistency, 110 YALE L.J. 237 (2000); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property 
Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1996). 
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actors little incentive to anticipate desirable legal changes,9 Shavell 
correctly notes that, in the regulatory context, because of the significant 
investments that new actors must make in order to respond to previous 
regulations, it is desirable in some instances to grandfather existing actors.10  
This Article attempts to reconcile these two competing positions by 
reconsidering Shavell’s and others’ arguments in favor of transition relief 
and by pointing out how existing analyses of this issue must be revised and 
expanded to deal with matters that have received insufficient attention. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part I summarizes the academic 
debate over transition relief and includes a detailed discussion of Shavell’s 
recent article and the model he uses to advance his thesis.  It also identifies 
what we believe to be the key gap in the current literature: Shavell and 
Kaplow both give insufficient attention to each other’s strongest argument.  
Shavell does not fully address Kaplow’s argument that providing transition 
relief discourages actors from anticipating legal changes, and Kaplow does 
not deal with Shavell’s argument that not providing transition relief to 
actors who have already invested in expensive technology in order to 
comply with existing law may be socially undesirable.  Part II discusses 
limitations of the domain over which Shavell’s theory is applicable and 
demonstrates that, even in a regulatory regime, actors can be induced to 
anticipate socially optimal legal changes.  Part III considers some of the 
long-term consequences of grandfathering as existing plants become more 
inefficient over time.  It shows that this inevitable decay counts as a 
significant argument against grandfathering. 
Our major contribution to the literature is presented in Part IV, where 
we discuss how the academic literature’s overarching approach to 
determining the desirability of grandfathering must be revised and 
expanded.  Under the current approach of the academic literature, the 
regulator first picks a socially optimal standard for new sources and then 
chooses the optimal transition rule for existing sources in light of that 
standard.  We argue that regulators should instead be making these two 
decisions simultaneously.  Indeed, the approach presently favored by the 
academic literature, which leads to a stringent new source standard and a 
permissive transition rule that is appropriate in light of the stringency of this 
new standard, might significantly discourage the construction of new plants 
and leave existing plants in operation over a long period of time.  In this 
situation, we argue that it would be socially desirable to select a somewhat-
less-stringent prospective standard coupled with a somewhat-more-stringent 
grandfathering rule.  But unless regulators make both decisions 
simultaneously, they cannot devise the optimal outcome.  Finally, in Part V, 
we discuss public choice pathologies associated with transition relief, 
focusing on the experience under the Clean Air Act.  Specifically, we 
 
9  Kaplow, supra note 2, at 615–16. 
10  Shavell, supra note 2, at 38–39. 
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suggest that coupling new regulations with generous transition relief can 
prevent those new regulations from having their intended effect and can 
also lead to wasteful lobbying. 
I. ACADEMIC DEBATE OVER LEGAL TRANSITIONS 
This Part briefly discusses the old view, but focuses on the new view 
and on qualifications of the new view.  In discussing these competing 
positions, we distinguish between the tax and regulatory literatures.  
Because this Article is focused on transition relief in the context of 
environmental regulation,11 we devote more attention to the latter. 
A. Old View 
What the literature now refers to as the old view is the position that 
transition relief should generally be provided so as to avoid upsetting settled 
expectations and to promote fairness.12  The basic argument is simply 
stated: because actors rely on the current law when organizing their affairs, 
it would be unjust to not provide them with transition relief.13  The 
argument presupposes that when investors and taxpayers make investment 
decisions, they are doing so based on the expectation that the law will not 
change.  Thus, when the law does change in a way that decreases the value 
of their investments, these actors unexpectedly experience losses for which 
they should be compensated.14 
 
11  This Article focuses on command-and-control regulation and thus does not discuss market-based 
regimes.  We also generally assume regulations that are enforced by injunction as opposed to a system 
of monetary damages.  For an argument that liability-based transition relief is preferable to property-
based relief in the context of environmental regulation, see Jonathan R. Nash, The Cathedral of 
Transition Relief in Environmental Law 2 (Nov. 11, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
authors).  For a discussion of which institutional actor is best suited to provide transition relief, see 
Jonathan S. Masur & Jonathan Remy Nash, The Institutional Dynamics of Transition Relief, 85 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 391, 436–55 (2010). 
12  SHAVIRO, supra note 2, at 2–3 (referring to the position that favors transition relief to protect 
reliance interests as the “old view”). 
13  This argument has often been advanced in the tax context.  See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, supra note 3, at 187–88; Comm. on Tax Policy, N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, supra note 3, at 23, 
27–28; Note, supra note 3, at 439.  Fairness arguments have also been made in favor of transition relief 
in a more general context.  See, e.g., Hochman, supra note 3, at 324; Michelman, supra note 3, at 1219, 
1223–24.  Jill Fisch has argued that “legal changes must be evaluated individually” and that “[i]n 
analyzing the effect of a particular new rule, it is necessary to consider the change in context”:  
[I]n the context of an unstable equilibrium our intuitions about the legitimacy of retroactivity are 
justified, and retroactive lawmaking is an appropriate and efficient means of clarifying, correcting, 
and incrementally adjusting the regulatory climate.  In a stable equilibrium, however, legal change 
imposes considerable costs on individuals subject to the change and on the legal system as a 
whole. 
Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1055, 
1100, 1123 (1997). 
14  While old-view scholarship is not as common as it was in the 1960s and 1970s, some recent work 
continues to support the old view.  See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Beware of Legal Transitions: A 
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Frank I. Michelman uses John Rawls’s theory of “justice as fairness” 
to develop a fairness argument in favor of transition relief, with the relief 
being provided in the form of compensation to actors negatively affected by 
the policy change.15  Michelman argues that the goal of a transition relief 
policy should be to minimize the long-run risk to individuals who will be 
potentially harmed by a legal change.16  Without a compensation policy, 
certain individuals will suffer significant losses when forced to comply with 
a new law.  With a compensation policy, however, the overall gains from a 
particular legal change will not be as high as they otherwise would be 
because of the costs of compensating those individuals—which Michelman 
refers to as “settlement costs.”17  Thus, Michelman argues that transition 
relief should be required “when settlement costs are low, when efficiency 
 
Presumptive Vote for the Reliance Interest, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 69, 70 (2003) (“The proper 
approach starts with a strong presumption and not a categorical denial: beware of legal transitions.  
Wherever possible try to keep the legal framework constant, and allow the response to societal changes 
to take place through private adjustments.”); Daniel E. Troy, Toward a Definition and Critique of 
Retroactivity, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1329, 1341–42 (2000) (arguing that retroactive legislation should be 
avoided because individuals base their behavior on the existing law and providing fair notice of legal 
changes is “fundamental to the rule of law”).  David Hasen has also recently attacked new-view 
scholarship as being “analytically deficient.”  David M. Hasen, Legal Transitions and the Problem of 
Reliance, 1 COLUM. J. TAX L. 120, 123–24 (2010) (arguing that new-view literature has failed to both 
“develop consistent definitions of such key concepts as ‘transition,’ ‘legal transition,’ and ‘transition 
norm’ . . . [and] demonstrate that a reliance-based view is unable to reach correct results on the question 
of the proper default norms for changes to positive law and for judicial decisions that adopt new rules”).   
The topic of retroactivity in the tax context was also recently debated at the 2010 European 
Association of Tax Law Professors Congress in Leuven, Belgium.  Daniel Shaviro argued against the 
provision of transition relief when disadvantageous tax changes are implemented, while Charlotte Crane 
argued in favor of transition relief.  See EUROPEAN ASS’N OF TAX LAW PROFESSORS, PROGRAM FOR 
CONGRESS (2010), available at http://www.eatlp.org/uploads/public/Program%20Leuven.pdf.  For a 
summary of the arguments advanced by Shaviro and Crane, see DANIEL SHAVIRO & CHARLOTTE 
CRANE, Retroactivity in Law & Economics, available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm_dlv3/groups/
public/@nyu_law_website__faculty__faculty_profiles__dshaviro/documents/documents/ecm_pro_
065857.pdf. 
15  Michelman, supra note 3, at 1219–21 (discussing transition relief in the context of the Takings 
Clause).  For a detailed discussion of optimal compensation under the Takings Clause, see Lawrence 
Blume, Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Perry Shapiro, The Taking of Land: When Should Compensation Be 
Paid?, 99 Q.J. ECON. 71 (1984). 
16  See Michelman, supra note 3, at 1223. 
17  “Settlement costs” are measured by the dollar value of the time, effort, and resources which 
would be required in order to reach compensation settlements adequate to avoid demoralization costs.  
Included are the costs of settling not only the particular compensation claims presented, but also those of 
all persons so affected by the measure in question or similar measures as to have claims not obviously 
distinguishable by the available settlement apparatus.  Id. at 1214.  Michelman also discusses what he 
terms “demoralization costs”:   
“Demoralization costs” are defined as the total of (1) the dollar value necessary to offset 
disutilities which accrue to losers and their sympathizers specifically from the realization that no 
compensation is offered, and (2) the present capitalized dollar value of lost future production 
(reflecting either impaired incentives or social unrest) caused by demoralization of uncompensated 
losers, their sympathizers, and other observers disturbed by the thought that they themselves may 
be subjected to similar treatment on some other occasion.   
Id. (footnote omitted). 
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gains [of the regulatory change] are dubious, and when the harm 
concentrated on one individual is unusually great.”18  In contrast, he argues 
that transition relief is not desirable when “settlement costs are high,” and 
the loss experienced by each individual is comparatively low.19 
B. ew View 
Proponents of the new view contend that transition relief is generally 
undesirable primarily because it removes the incentives to anticipate legal 
change.  We first discuss the new view in the tax context—where the view 
was first articulated—and then focus on the arguments advanced in the 
regulatory context. 
1. Tax Context.—Michael J. Graetz was the first scholar to present a 
sustained challenge to the old view that transition relief is necessary when a 
new tax law is adopted.20  Graetz first argues that, as market principles 
suggest, it is in fact efficient to anticipate changes.21  Investors must always 
anticipate changes in the markets; similarly, they should anticipate changes 
in the law.22  Moreover, Graetz argues that transition relief in the form of 
grandfathering “reduce[s] whatever benefits are expected to be realized 
from the change in the law” and “increase[s] planning and enforcement 
costs for both taxpayers and the government.”23 
Graetz also attacks the reliance argument used by old-view scholars, 
which states that because taxpayers have relied on the laws in making 
investment decisions, an uncompensated change is unfair and tantamount to 
the government suddenly changing the terms of a contract.24  He points out 
that it is not reasonable for people to assume that tax laws will never 
 
18  Id. at 1223. 
19  Id.  Louis Kaplow agrees that the failure to compensate will somewhat discourage certain 
investments but argues that “this ‘disincentive’ [is] necessary to eliminate the overinvestment that would 
result from compensation.”  See Kaplow, supra note 2, at 561.  While Michelman does discuss 
efficiency concerns and maximizing total utility, he stresses that the compensation decision should 
ultimately be based on justice “without regard to the effect of the decision on the net social product.”  
Michelman, supra note 3, at 1219.  Martin Feldstein, writing in the tax context, suggests that transition 
relief is important to avoid “inefficient precautionary behavior.”  Martin Feldstein, On the Theory of Tax 
Reform, 6 J. PUB. ECON. 77, 93 (1976).  For example, he argues that proposals to nullify the “oil 
depletion allowance” have inefficiently decreased investment in oil.  Id.  He contends that the way to 
prevent this inefficient behavior is to consistently provide transition relief because then “investors know 
that they will be fully compensated for any losses that result from reform.”  Id. at 98.  Michael J. Graetz 
criticizes Feldstein for providing no explanation as to why anticipating legal changes leads to inefficient 
behavior and argues that market principles suggest that the opposite is true.  See Graetz, supra note 2, at 
64–65. 
20  See Graetz, supra note 2. 
21  Id. at 65. 
22  Id. at 65–66. 
23  Id. at 71. 
24  Id. at 74. 
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change, especially when particular events signal that a change in tax law is 
very likely.25  He also explains that granting compensation or providing 
grandfathering provisions whenever a law is changed delays or stifles legal 
and regulatory innovation.26  
Daniel Shaviro adopts a similar approach in his book, When Rules 
Change: An Economic and Political Analysis of Transition Relief and 
Retroactivity, which analyzes transition relief primarily in the tax context, 
though it also includes some discussion of the regulatory context.27  Shaviro 
suggests that whether transition relief is desirable depends on whether the 
legal change should be described as a policy change or an accounting 
change and notes that all tax rules have these two types of characteristics—
“those that are policy relevant and those that are merely accounting 
conventions.”28  Shaviro goes on to state that “[policy relevant] 
features . . . decide how tax burdens are actually distributed between 
taxpayers and allocated between economic activities at 
equilibrium . . . [while] accounting conventions [refer to] the details of 
exactly how, when, and from whom the taxes that give rise to these relevant 
burdens are collected.”29 
Like Graetz, Shaviro finds that transition relief is generally 
inappropriate in the context of policy changes.30  He notes a large imbalance 
 
25  Id. at 75–76 (noting that reliance may no longer be reasonable once the President publicly 
endorses a change or one or both houses of Congress pass a bill). 
26  See id. at 71 (“[G]randfathered effective dates will often reduce whatever benefits are expected to 
be realized from the change in the law.  The social gains to be realized from the change will often be 
delayed with a grandfathered effective date.”). 
27  SHAVIRO, supra note 2, at 2–3, 7, 10–11, 62–63, 81–86. 
28  Id. at 8; accord id. at 7–8, 13, 53 (discussing “policy change” retroactive taxes). 
29  Id. at 8.  To use Shaviro’s example, consider the municipal bond preference which exempts from 
taxation interest earned on municipal bonds.  Id.  The policy-relevant feature is to prefer municipal 
bonds to other investment types.  There are also various accounting features which were adopted in 
order to accomplish the policy goal.  Id. at 8–9.  For example, this tax benefit is provided to bondholders 
rather than issuers, even though providing the tax preference to issuers would have the same intended 
economic effect.  Id. at 9.  In the case of a policy change, a general norm of not providing transition 
relief serves the purpose of that policy change by producing desirable ex ante incentive effects.  See id. 
at 7, 60.  For example, banning a hazardous product constitutes a “policy change” because not providing 
transition relief in the event of the ban advances the purpose of the legal change—product safety—by 
giving manufacturers an ex ante incentive to only invest in safe products.  However, with an accounting 
change, a general norm of not providing transition relief does not advance the purpose of the legal 
change.  See id. at 62.  To use Shaviro’s example, suppose the prevailing currency, which has a green 
color, is abandoned in favor of a red currency because the green currency is easily forged.  Id. at 10.  In 
this case, providing no transition relief—and thus not permitting individuals holding green currency to 
trade in their green currency for new red currency—would be undesirable because it would not advance 
the purpose of the new law.  Id.  Our discussion in the text concerns only policy changes. 
30  While Shaviro’s conclusion regarding policy changes is in line with Graetz’s, his reasoning is 
somewhat different.  While Graetz suggests that “change[s] in tastes or societal conditions [are] 
reflected through the political process,” see Graetz, supra note 2, at 65, Shaviro questions the extent to 
which “public political choice” (which is reflected in the laws that are passed) is actually similar to 
“private consumer choice” (which is reflected by market demand).  SHAVIRO, supra note 2, at 64.  It is 
105:1581  (2011) Regulatory Change 
 1589 
in transition relief policy when it comes to gains versus losses.31  While 
transition relief is often afforded to those who are harmed by a particular 
legal change, those who benefit typically do not have to pay back their 
resulting gains.32  Indeed, while individuals who experience a windfall loss 
from a change in the tax law are often compensated, individuals who 
experience a windfall gain are almost never required to pay it back.33  In 
light of this asymmetry, Shaviro opposes transition relief for policy changes 
regardless of whether the underlying policy change is desirable.34 
2. Regulatory Context.—Louis Kaplow presents a general version of 
the argument against transition relief in the regulatory context.35  He argues 
that market-based solutions to transition problems are generally preferable 
to government solutions and points out that this position is well-accepted in 
the case of market-induced transitions.36  Indeed, a person who invests in a 
product that turns out to be unsuccessful is not compensated for her poor 
investment decision.  Kaplow argues that just as transition relief is 
inappropriate in market-induced transitions, it is similarly inappropriate in 
the case of government-induced transitions.37 
 
desirable to “let[] the owners of an ice cream parlor absorb the loss from a decline in the public’s taste 
for ice cream [because] it may induce them to try harder to determine what the public wants.”  Id.  
Shaviro, however, suggests that making investors bear the risk of a legal change may not make as much 
sense as making them bear the risk of a market change because, while the demand for a particular 
product tends to be a good indicator of consumer choice, the laws that are passed are not necessarily 
good indicators of overall public opinion, partly for public choice reasons.  Id. at 67–71.  Shaviro argues 
that this is the case for three reasons: problems of aggregation, problems of organization, and problems 
of information:   
[C]ollective choice requires aggregating people’s preferences rather than giving each one the result 
he wants.  Hence, the point that 49 percent of the people can buy their own ice cream but not pass 
their own law.  Amongst other implications, aggregation is likely to reduce the level of voter 
investment in attempting to make good decisions. 
Id. at 67.  Other aggregation problems also arise because people may choose not to vote because “[t]he 
value of a single vote is so low” and because “voting, unlike the use of money to buy consumer goods, is 
ordinal rather than cardinal” and thus does not reveal the intensity of voter preferences.  Id. at 67, 69–72 
(discussing how interest group theory suggests that “democratic politics tends to produce transfers from 
the many to the few” and noting that information problems are even worse “in the realm of public 
political choice” than in the market context). 
31  SHAVIRO, supra note 2, at 89–90. 
32  Id. at 89 (explaining that, in the tax context, “the political impetus to compensate transition losses 
exceeds that to deny transition gains”). 
33  Id. at 229 (noting that a norm of not providing transition relief for policy changes “would tend to 
reduce the prevailing asymmetry in favor of providing greater transitional adjustment when income tax 
preferences that worsen resource allocation are curtailed than when they are expanded”). 
34  Id. 
35  See Kaplow, supra note 2. 
36  Id. at 513–14. 
37  In making his argument, Kaplow primarily discusses the transition policy of compensation; 
however, he explains that his argument generally applies to other forms of transition relief as well.  See 
id. at 556 n.133. 
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The thrust of Kaplow’s analysis involves a discussion of transition 
relief in terms of risk and incentives.  First, he argues that compensating 
“losers” under the new law “insulates investors from the real effects of their 
decisions, and thus distorts their behavior,” leading to overinvestment in 
their activity.38  To illustrate this point, Kaplow presents two examples.  In 
one, a particular piece of land is at risk of being seized by the government 
in order to build a highway.39  If the landowner knew that she would be 
fully compensated for the value of the property, she might have an incentive 
to improve the land, even knowing that the land would eventually be 
leveled.  She would not undertake such improvements, however, if she had 
to bear the risk of uncompensated government action.  In the other example, 
if a product manufacturer knows that it will be compensated by the 
government in the event that its product is subsequently banned, it might 
continue to invest resources in manufacturing the product even when the 
probability of a ban is high.40  Thus, in both cases, government-sponsored 
transition relief can promote inefficient behavior. 
Kaplow argues that while uncertainty about future changes in law 
produces risk, market-based approaches to risk management are preferable 
to government compensation schemes.  Specifically, because government 
compensation can result in overinvestment, it is better for actors to deal 
with risk by purchasing insurance or by diversifying their investments.41  
Kaplow acknowledges that the insurance solution is not perfect because 
there are many cases in which actors will underestimate risk and thus not 
purchase insurance.42  Still, he argues that instead of compensating 
individuals who have failed to purchase insurance, the government can 
better deal with this problem by requiring people to purchase such 
insurance in the first place.43 
Saul Levmore has also contributed to the transition relief debate in the 
regulatory context.44  He explains that not granting transition relief can 
cause meaningful social reforms to occur more quickly than they otherwise 
would.45  For example, if a chemical manufacturer is compensated in the 
event that a chemical it produces is banned, it has no incentive to acquire 
more information about the chemical.46  As a result, a ban that would be 
 
38  Id. at 513, 519. 
39  Id. at 529. 
40  Id. 
41  Id. at 527–28. 
42  Id. at 548. 
43  Id. at 549. 
44  See Saul Levmore, Changes, Anticipations, and Reparations, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1657 (1999). 
45  See id. at 1663 (“[R]egulated firms know or could know more than the government about likely 
subjects of regulatory concern and, therefore, might be in the best position to forecast the coming, good 
law . . . [but] if the law is such that these firms know that they will be compensated for the cost of legal 
change, then they have little incentive to anticipate new law.”). 
46  Id. at 1658–59. 
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socially valuable could be delayed.  If, however, the manufacturer must 
bear the risk of a ban, it has an incentive to gather such information.  If it 
finds that the chemical is harmful, it might fear the possibility of a 
subsequent ban and therefore invest resources in developing an alternative 
chemical that does not produce harmful results.  Thus, where actors have an 
incentive to anticipate changes, they might do so prior to government 
action.47  And even if a firm does not stop using the product voluntarily, it 
will be more likely to develop a contingency plan if it knows that it would 
be affected by a subsequent ban. 
C. Qualifications of the ew View 
While the arguments advanced by Kaplow, Graetz, Shaviro, and 
Levmore have been very influential, they have not gone unchallenged.48  
Recently, Steven Shavell has offered a compelling critique of the new view 
by demonstrating that, in the context of regulatory standards, a policy of 
grandfathering will often minimize total social costs.49  Specifically, he 
suggests that for actors who have already complied with previous 
 
47  Id. at 1663 (“The more aggressive the expected application of these new rules, the more it seems 
likely that well-informed firms will choose to substitute other, less harmful inputs before the 
government . . . devises the new controls.”). 
48  In the tax context, a few scholars have attacked or at least qualified the view that transition relief 
is generally inappropriate.  See Kyle D. Logue, Tax Transitions, Opportunistic Retroactivity, and the 
Benefits of Government Precommitment, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1138–40 (1996) (arguing that it is 
economically efficient to provide transition relief in the context of incentive subsidies); J. Mark 
Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, Tax Transitions and the Protection Racket: A Reply to Professors 
Graetz and Kaplow, 75 VA. L. REV. 1155, 1163–65 (1989) (arguing that transition relief can be desirable 
because it minimizes wasteful postenactment lobbying costs).  Like Shaviro, Ramseyer and Nakazato 
criticize the assumption that most tax legislation is efficient and thus desirable.  Ramseyer & Nakazato, 
supra, at 1163.  Ramseyer and Nakazato also suggest that, even if new tax legislation is generally 
desirable, providing transition relief is more efficient than not providing it because transition relief 
minimizes wasteful postenactment lobbying costs.  Id. at 1173.  Kyle Logue argues that it is 
economically efficient to provide transition relief in the context of incentive subsidies, which he defines 
as “provisions whose primary purpose is to alter taxpayers’ decisions regarding how they will invest 
their resources.”  Logue, supra, at 1138 (emphasis omitted).  He argues that if transition relief is not 
provided for incentive subsidies, then “future incentive credits would have to be more generous . . . to 
achieve the same amount of increased investment in the targeted asset or activity.”  Id. at 1139.  To use 
Logue’s example, suppose there was a dearth of low-income housing.  Id. at 1144.  To remedy this 
situation, the government might decide to pass an incentive subsidy and grant a tax credit to individuals 
who invest in low-income housing.  Id.  By granting this credit, people who otherwise would not invest 
in low-income housing would be encouraged to do so.  If this incentive subsidy was later repealed and 
transition relief was not provided, those investors would suffer a transition loss.  See id. at 1133, 1139.  
This would cause future investors to be more cautious when making investments based on promised tax 
credits because there is a possibility that the government would repeal the tax credit, making their 
investments unprofitable.  Id. at 1140.  Thus, in order to ensure that the proper level of investment is 
achieved, the government would have to increase future incentive subsidies or, to use Logue’s 
terminology, increase the “default premium.”  Id. at 1139. 
49  Shavell, supra note 2, at 38–39. 
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regulations by purchasing durable precautions,50 such as smoke scrubbers, it 
can be socially costly to require the purchase of new durable precautions in 
response to new regulations.51  Before explaining Shavell’s argument in 
detail, it is useful to describe Shavell’s model and some of his background 
assumptions. 
1. Shavell’s Model.—First, Shavell considers two periods of time.   
In period one, he assumes that some actors are already participating in a 
particular activity, and in period two, new actors may enter the activity.52  
Thus, some actors will participate in the given activity during both periods 
one and two while others will participate only in period two.  The number 
of firms entering in each of the periods is exogenous to Shavell’s model and 
is therefore not affected by the transition rule.53 
Second, Shavell assumes that in period one there is uncertainty about 
the magnitude of the harm caused by the activity.  For example, it might be 
known that the harm caused falls somewhere between $100,000 and 
$1,000,000, but the exact amount might be unknown.  Shavell further 
assumes that this uncertainty is resolved by the beginning of period two.54  
At that point, the actual magnitude of the harm becomes known and the 
desirable level of investment for safety can then be determined.  The 
participants in period one have already invested in some level of abatement 
technology.  Shavell assumes that this technology is not optimal in period 
two once the precise harm is ascertained.55 
Third, Shavell distinguishes between durable precautions and 
nondurable precautions.  Durable precautions “involve the acquisition of a 
safety device . . . or relate to fixed physical aspects of property,” and 
nondurable precautions “take the form of effort to reduce risk.”56  While an 
actor can continue to use in period two at little or no cost a durable 
precaution that was purchased in period one, the cost of a nondurable 
precaution in period two is independent of its cost in period one.57  For 
example, if a company purchases a smoke scrubber in period one, it can 
continue to use the smoke scrubber in period two at no cost (assuming no 
maintenance costs).  In contrast, the cost of nondurable precautions, such as 
frequent inspections to ensure that equipment is operating properly, will 
cost the same in period two as they do in period one, and the fact that a 
 
50  See infra text accompanying notes 56–59. 
51  Shavell, supra note 2, at 38–39. 
52  See id. at 41. 
53  Id. at 56–57.  Shavell acknowledges that grandfathering may actually increase participation in 
certain activities and that “because such enhanced participation would tend to be socially undesirable, 
grandfathering would be socially desirable less often than [he] found it to be.”  Id. at 57. 
54  Id. at 42. 
55  Id. at 42–43. 
56  Id. at 41–42. 
57  Id. 
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nondurable precaution was undertaken in period one does not affect its cost 
in period two.58  Shavell shows that, while grandfathering is never optimal 
for nondurable precautions, it is sometimes optimal for durable 
precautions.59  Because the only controversy about grandfathering involves 
durable precautions, they will be the focus of the remainder of this Article. 
Using this model, Shavell demonstrates that, for durable precautions, 
total social costs—which he defines as “the costs of precautions over the 2 
periods plus the expected harm done”60—will often be minimized with a 
policy of grandfathering.  Specifically, when the cost of a new precaution 
exceeds the benefit from the expected reduction in harm achieved by 
switching to the new precaution, social welfare is enhanced if the actor 
continues to use the precaution used in period one. 
To illustrate that grandfathering can be socially desirable in such 
instances, Shavell offers the following numerical example.61  Suppose that 
in period one a firm is engaging in a particular activity and, in an effort to 
decrease the probability of harm caused by the activity, the firm purchases a 
device that lowers the risk of harm to 7%.  In period two, the total harm 
caused by the activity absent any precautions is determined to be $700,000.  
Suppose that for this harm the optimal precaution for a new firm costs 
$20,000 and would decrease the risk of harm to 5%.  The existing firm 
could continue to use its period-one precaution during period two at no 
additional cost or it could transition to the optimal precaution at a cost of 
$20,000.  Suppose a new regulation requires that firms take the optimal 
precaution.  Shavell argues that, in this instance, grandfathering is 
appropriate because the total social cost of investing in the new technology 
exceeds the social cost of maintaining the old technology.  If the firm keeps 
its old technology, it bears no additional pollution control costs, so the total 
social cost just equals the probability of harm times the magnitude of the 
harm: 0.07 x $700,000 = $49,000.  However, if the firm switches to the new 
technology, it must pay $20,000 and the expected harm to society is 0.05 x 
$700,000 = $35,000.  Thus, the total social cost of transitioning is $55,000.  
Because this cost is greater than the social cost of not switching to the new 
technology—$49,000—grandfathering is socially optimal in this example. 
2. Gap in the Literature.—To summarize, Graetz and Kaplow made 
a significant contribution by identifying that, just as transition relief is 
inappropriate in market-induced transitions, transition relief is inappropriate 
in government-induced transitions.  The expectation of transition relief 
discourages actors from considering the risk of legal change in making 
decisions and thus induces them to make socially inefficient decisions.  
 
58  Id. 
59  Id. at 46–47. 
60  Id. at 44. 
61  See id. at 46–47. 
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Shavell presented a significant counterargument by demonstrating that a 
policy of no transition relief can prove socially costly when actors have 
already invested in expensive technology in order to comply with 
previously enacted regulations.62 
Each of the competing positions, however, is incomplete.  In a 
regulatory context, where there is investment in durable precautions, 
Kaplow’s article does not consider the costs facing existing actors that are 
confronted with new regulations.  As Shavell demonstrates, the costs of 
retrofitting an existing facility may sufficiently outweigh the benefits, 
making it socially desirable to grandfather existing sources.63  At the same 
time, as we show in Part II, given certain realities of the administrative 
state, Shavell’s article does not completely address the problem recognized 
by Kaplow: actors have no incentive to anticipate legal changes if transition 
relief is provided.64  Thus, two of the strongest arguments concerning 
grandfathering point in different directions and so far no effort has been 
made to reconcile the positions in order to derive a more complete theory 
concerning the desirability of transition relief.  We now turn to that inquiry. 
II. ANTICIPATING NEW LEGAL STANDARDS 
In this Part, we expand upon Shavell’s analysis to demonstrate that 
grandfathering might discourage actors from voluntarily anticipating legal 
changes where grandfathering would be socially optimal.  Specifically, we 
discuss three of Shavell’s assumptions—(1) that regulations effectively 
dictate actors’ behavior,65 (2) that new regulations are adopted swiftly 
following the discovery of new information,66 and (3) that regulators have 
perfect information about future conditions67—and suggest that they are 
inconsistent with the general structure of the administrative state.  We focus 
on the environmental context because environmental regulations account 
 
62  Id. at 79. 
63  Perhaps the reason Kaplow does not address this argument is that his article is primarily 
concerned with a strict liability regime, and grandfathering is always undesirable in strict liability 
regimes where “parties will automatically be induced to take past behavior into account in a socially 
appropriate manner.”  Id. at 39. 
64  Kaplow, supra note 2, at 531–32.  Shavell argues that “[t]he key to understanding the difference 
in conclusions is to note that the transitions literature does not distinguish between legal rules based on 
legal standards and legal rules based on strict liability.”  Shavell, supra note 2, at 78.  However, as we 
demonstrate, actors can also be expected to anticipate legal changes when those changes are based on 
legal standards.  See infra Part II. 
65  See Shavell, supra note 2, at 79. 
66  Id. at 42–43, 80 (assuming that “present regulated behavior . . . appropriately reflect[s] all 
possible future changes in the world”). 
67  Id. at 80 (“[T]he legal standard in period 1 impounds correctly all possible future changes in harm 
in period 2.”). 
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for a significant portion of federal regulatory activity68 and because most of 
Shavell’s examples involve regulations aimed at reducing pollution.69 
First, Shavell suggests that an actor’s behavior is prescribed by the 
legal standards and thus that the actor cannot choose to anticipate a future 
standard by installing technology that deviates from the existing 
regulations.  “In the first place, parties’ present behavior is by hypothesis 
regulated—it must satisfy a legal standard; it is not behavior that parties are 
free to choose and thus that could be influenced by anticipated future 
changes in the law.”70  For Shavell, the regulatory regime prescribes the 
adoption of a particular technology: “The smoke scrubber that a firm 
installs today is not one that the firm is free to choose; in a regulated world, 
the scrubber must be of the type prescribed by the regulators.”71  Thus, in 
period one, a party could not choose to install more advanced technology if 
it suspected that the regulation would be strengthened in the future. 
As we argue in section A, most environmental regulatory standards, 
however, are performance standards.  They typically require that plants 
meet an emissions standard that is achievable through the use of the “best 
available technology,” as determined by the regulator.72  They are not 
design standards, which actually mandate the use of a particular 
technology.73  Actors subject to performance standards can use whatever 
technology they want, as long as the resulting emissions are no higher than 
those that would result from the “best available technology.”  Thus, 
regulated firms are not precluded from making pollution abatement 
decisions that anticipate regulatory change. 
If there is no promise of transition relief, actors subject to a 
performance standard may rationally decide to comply with a more 
stringent standard that they believe will be adopted in the near future.  For 
example, if regulations require the installation of smoke scrubbers that 
reduce emissions by a certain percentage, a firm that anticipates stricter 
regulations in the future might rationally choose to spend more money now 
for more efficient scrubbers that would reduce emissions by a higher-than-
required percentage, thus saving the higher costs of retrofitting its plant in 
the future.  Of course, because Shavell also assumes that regulators have 
perfect information regarding future uncertainties, a firm under his model 
 
68  See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1268 (2006) (noting that the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
(OIRA) primarily focuses on Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations due to their economic 
significance). 
69  See Shavell, supra note 2, at 38 (“Consider a firm that installed a type of smoke scrubber that 
satisfied pollution-control rules 5 years ago when the firm built a factory.”). 
70  Id. at 79. 
71  Id. 
72  See infra notes 78–83 and accompanying text. 
73  See infra notes 78–79 and accompanying text. 
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would never elect to do more than the regulation required.74  As we argue in 
section C, however, in a world where regulators do not have perfect 
information or are precluded by law from promulgating regulations based 
on their probabilistic assessment of future changes, firms may rationally 
invest in more effective pollution control technology in anticipation of 
future regulations. 
Second, Shavell’s model assumes that regulatory changes occur 
immediately following the generation of new information.  While 
acknowledging that in the real world laws are generally stable and do not 
change very often,75 for the purposes of his model he assumes that the law 
swiftly changes in response to new information.76  Thus, once the regulator 
determines that a particular pollutant is more harmful than was originally 
thought, it immediately promulgates new regulations reflecting this new 
information.  In section B we suggest, instead, that there is inevitable 
delay—often lengthy delay—between new information and regulatory 
changes and that, during this period, actors can be encouraged to anticipate 
socially optimal legal changes if they are not promised transition relief. 
Third, Shavell’s model assumes that regulators have perfect 
information and that legal standards are optimally developed, taking into 
account present information regarding future changes.77  Thus, under 
Shavell’s model, a regulated actor would never adopt technology that is 
more stringent than the technology required by the legal standard because 
the legal standard reflects all information about future uncertainties.  In 
section C, we argue that regulators do not have access to perfect 
information about future uncertainties in crafting regulations and that the 
regulated firms often have superior information about such uncertainties.  
We also suggest that, because of certain administrative law constraints, 
regulators would not be able to develop standards based on probabilistic 
assessments of future changes even if they had perfect information about 
the future. 
Finally, in section D, we use an extension of Shavell’s model to 
demonstrate that a policy of no transition relief can induce actors to 
anticipate future legal changes in a way that is socially optimal.  Thus, we 
show that Shavell’s restrictive assumptions skew the argument in favor of 
 
74  Shavell, supra note 2, at 49–50, 61–62. 
75  Id. at 68–69 (discussing general stability of the law). 
76  Id. at 42–43 (noting that the uncertainty about the level of harm is resolved by the beginning of 
period 2 and that, at this time, the law will change “in the light of the new information and 
circumstances”); see also id. at 80 (assuming that present regulations reflect “all possible future changes 
in the world”). 
77  Id. at 80 (assuming that “present regulated behavior . . . appropriately reflect[s] all possible future 
changes in the world” and that “the legal standard in period 1 impounds correctly all possible future 
changes in harm in period 2”).  Shavell does, however, acknowledge that imperfect information of the 
state may change the analysis.  Id. at 54–55. 
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grandfathering by ruling out the possibility that firms could desirably 
anticipate future legal regulatory requirements. 
A. Performance Standards Versus Design Standards 
In determining the desirability of grandfathering provisions, an 
important consideration is whether the regulatory regime imposes a 
performance standard or a design standard.  We show in this section that the 
regulatory regime strongly favors performance standards over design 
standards. 
A performance standard sets an emission limitation by reference to the 
pollution level that would be attained through the use of the best available 
technology, but does not actually mandate the use of any particular 
technology.78  In contrast, a design standard requires an actor to use a 
particular technology.  Generally, performance standards are considered 
preferable because they give regulated actors more flexibility and 
encourage technological innovation.79  If the regulation requires all plants to 
purchase a particular type of smoke scrubber, there is little incentive for 
someone to develop a more effective or cheaper scrubber because regulated 
plants would not be able to use the better scrubber until the regulator 
changed the design standard.80  In some cases, however, it is very difficult 
(or even impossible) to measure the pollution being emitted.81  In those 
cases, design standards are desirable because the benefit of ensuring that an 
actor is using a particular technology known to reduce pollution may in fact 
 
78  See RICHARD L. REVESZ, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 168 (2008) (noting that 
performance standards are set “by reference to what the best available technology can accomplish, but 
. . .  each source [may] choose the actual technology that it intends to use in order to meet the standard”); 
Nathaniel O. Keohane, Richard L. Revesz & Robert N. Stavins, The Choice of Regulatory Instruments 
in Environmental Policy, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 313 (1998) (noting that although design 
standards “requir[e] a particular technology’s usage . . . performance standards prescrib[e] the maximum 
amount of pollution that a source can emit”); Sydney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Goals, 
Instruments, and Environmental Policy Choice, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 297, 308 (2000) 
(“Performance standards rely on particular technologies to formulate pollution reduction goals, but do 
not dictate that those same technologies be used as policy instruments to achieve those goals.”). 
79  See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48 
STAN. L. REV. 247, 268 (1996)  (“[I]f an industry can comply with a sulfur dioxide emission standard by 
either using clean coal or implementing energy conservation methods, government should not command 
a particular method of compliance.”); Edward W. Warren & Gary E. Marchant, “More Good Than 
Harm”: A First Principle for Environmental Agencies and Reviewing Courts, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 379, 
425–26 (1993) (“‘[P]erformance standards,’ which allow regulated companies to choose their own 
methods of compliance, are more cost effective than ‘design standards,’ which impose specific 
compliance methods.”). 
80  See REVESZ, supra note 78, at 168; Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 78, at 305 (“In theory at 
least, regulated entities subject to a performance standard have an incentive to develop such alternative 
means if they provide a more efficient means of achieving the regulatory goal.”). 
81  See infra text accompanying notes 101–05 (discussing Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 
434 U.S. 275, 289 (1978)). 
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exceed the cost of stifling technological innovation by removing the 
incentive for the actor to seek more effective technology. 
Some may wonder whether performance standards are effectively 
design standards in that there may only be one way to meet a particular 
performance standard.  In practice, however, there are often multiple ways 
to comply with typical performance standards.  For example, an electric 
utility can meet the applicable standard of 1.2 pounds of sulfur dioxide per 
million BTUs of heat input by burning low-sulfur coal (without any 
treatment technology) or by scrubbing high-sulfur coal.82  Moreover, even if 
there was only one way to meet a particular standard, a standard styled as a 
performance standard and not a design standard would not impede a higher 
level of control, which a polluter might choose in anticipation of a more 
stringent standard. 
For the most part, federal environmental statutes impose performance 
standards as opposed to design standards.83  The Clean Air Act requires that 
new and modified84 sources meet federally set best available technology 
(BAT) standards.85  While these emission standards are set by reference to 
what the best available technology, as defined by the EPA, would achieve, 
the regulated firm is free to use any technology that will achieve the 
emission standard.86  The Clean Air Act originally required that all new and 
modified sources comply with a New Source Performance Standard 
(NSPS), which is defined as: 
[A] standard for emissions of air pollutants which reflects the degree of 
emission limitation achievable through the application of the best system of 
emission reduction which (taking into account the cost of achieving such 
 
82  See Bruce A. Ackerman & William T. Hassler, Beyond the ew Deal: Coal and the Clean Air 
Act, 89 YALE L.J. 1466, 1485 & n.71 (1980); REVESZ, supra note 78, at 216–17; see also BRUCE A. 
ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 31–54 (1981) (discussing political 
considerations that motivate alternate methods for complying with the applicable standard). 
83  See Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 78, at 306–07; Wendy E. Wagner, The Triumph of 
Technology-Based Standards, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 83, 90 (“[A]lmost all technology-based 
standards . . . take the form of quantitative pollution limits and thus allow industry to choose how to best 
meet the standards—a choice that includes developing new pollution control technologies that run more 
cheaply or effectively.”). 
84  For a detailed discussion of what constitutes a modification, see Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard 
L. Revesz, supra note 1.  See also infra notes 232–34 and accompanying text (discussing how certain 
modifications trigger new source review under the Clean Air Act). 
85  42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1)–(2), (b)(1)(B), (b)(4) (2006) (providing that stringent federal performance 
standards apply to “new sources” of air pollution and including modified sources within the definition of 
“new source”). 
86  See, e.g., Robert L. Glicksman, Balancing Mandate and Discretion in the Institutional Design of 
Federal Climate Change Policy, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 196, 205 (2008) (“The EPA must 
identify the best available technology for a particular industry and calculate the performance-based 
results that the identified technology is capable of achieving.  Industry is then free to comply by using 
the identified technology or any other means it prefers that allow more efficient compliance.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
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reduction and any nonair quality health and environmental impact and energy 
requirements) the Administrator determines has been adequately 
demonstrated.87 
Thus, NSPS is set in reference to the level of emissions that would 
result from the “best system of emission reduction,” taking costs into 
account, that has been “adequately demonstrated.”88  It does not, however, 
actually require the adoption of the “best system of emission reduction.”89  
A firm can use any technology it wants as long as its resulting emissions are 
no higher than those that would result from the technology that the 
regulator deems to be “best.”90 
The 1977 Amendments to the Clean Air Act adopted two additional 
federal emission standards—Best Available Control Technology (BACT) 
and Lowest Achievable Emission Rate (LAER).91  Major new or modified 
stationary sources92 located in states with air quality that is better than the 
quality required by the federal ambient standards must comply with 
BACT.93  Major new or modified stationary sources located in 
nonattainment regions—areas that are not in compliance with the federal 
ambient standards—must comply with LAER.  BACT is defined as “an 
emission limitation based on the maximum degree of reduction of each 
pollutant . . . [determined] on a case-by-case basis, taking into account 
energy, environmental, and economic impact[].”94  LAER is defined as the 
most stringent emission standard in any state implementation plan95 or the 
most stringent emission standard achieved in practice by category of source, 
whichever is more stringent.96  Both BACT and LAER prescribe a 
 
87  § 7411(a)(1). 
88  Id. 
89  Id. 
90  Id. 
91  The 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments created two new programs—the Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration (PSD) Program and the Nonattainment Program.  PSD was aimed at preserving the air 
quality in regions where air quality was superior to the quality required by the National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards (NAAQS).  Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 
(1977); REVESZ, supra note 78, at 373, 384–85.  The Nonattainment Program provisions are aimed at 
those areas that have not achieved compliance with the primary NAAQS.  REVESZ, supra note 78, at 
384–85. 
92  The term “major emitting facility” is defined by the source’s “potential to emit.”  § 7479(1).  The 
term “stationary source,” as opposed to mobile source, is defined in § 7602(z). 
93  Id. § 7479(3). 
94  Id. 
95  The relevant statutory language reads:  
Each State shall . . . adopt and submit to the Administrator . . . a plan which provides for 
implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of such primary standard in each air quality 
control region . . . within such State.  In addition, such State shall adopt and submit to the 
Administrator . . . a plan which provides for implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of 
such secondary standard in each air quality control region . . . within such State. 
Id. § 7410(a)(1). 
96  Id. § 7501(3)(A)–(B). 
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maximum level of emissions, not the use of any particular technology.  
Because all air quality control regions are either in attainment or 
nonattainment, BACT and LAER are the primary relevant standards for 
“major” sources.  NSPS, though, applies to all new or modified sources that 
are not major sources and also sets a floor for both BACT and LAER.97 
While the Clean Air Act requires new or modified sources to comply 
with performance standards, it does not generally impose such requirements 
on existing sources.  As long as states develop implementation plans that 
result in compliance with the relevant federal ambient standard, states have 
great discretion in how they will regulate particular existing sources.98  Even 
so, states generally employ performance standards in their state 
implementation plans.99  The one significant exception to the federal 
deference on existing sources concerns nonattainment regions.  The 1990 
Amendments to the Clean Air Act prescribe that existing sources in 
nonattainment areas are subject to an emission standard set by reference to 
Reasonably Available Control Technology (RACT)100—again a 
performance standard because it does not require the adoption of a 
particular technology. 
In enacting the Clean Air Act, Congress indicated a “strong preference 
for numerical emission limitations,”101 though the Act does permit the 
Administrator to implement design standards or work-practice standards 
when “it is not feasible . . . to prescribe or enforce an emission standard.”102 
Thus, when it is difficult to measure emissions, the Administrator may 
adopt a design standard instead of a performance standard.  For example, in 
order to regulate asbestos emissions, the Administrator originally proposed 
a prohibition of “all visible emissions of asbestos during the course of 
demolitions.”103  The Administrator, however, later determined that the “no 
visible emission” requirement might prohibit demolitions altogether 
because “it would be impracticable, if not impossible, to do such work 
 
97  Id. §§ 7479(3), 7501(3); see REVESZ, supra note 78, at 374, 387. 
98  § 7410(a)(1). 
99  The Clean Air Act requires states to adopt enforceable emission limitations.  See § 7410(a)(2)(A); 
see also D. R. van der Vaart & John C. Evans, Location, Location, Location: Did North Carolina Go 
Far Enough?, 10 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 267, 269 (2009) (“The strategy that states develop to satisfy their 
obligation as the primary implementing agency—typically a mixture of emission standards and 
regulations—is collectively referred to as the [State Implementation Plan].”). 
100  Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 172(c)(1), 104 Stat. 2412, 2414 
(1990); see Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Air Quality Protection Using State Implementation Plans—Thirty-
Seven Years of Increasing Complexity, 15 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 209, 227 (2004). 
101  Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 289 (1978) (quoting S. REP. NO. 95-127, 
at 44 (1977)). 
102  42 U.S.C. § 7412(h)(1); see also Adamo, 434 U.S. at 286 (quoting Clean Air Act Amendments 
of 1977 § 110). 
103  See Adamo, 434 U.S. at 287. 
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without creating visible emissions.”104  As a result of these feasibility 
concerns, the Administrator mandated that certain work practices be 
followed during a demolition, adopting a design standard instead of a 
performance standard.105 
The Clean Water Act also primarily imposes performance standards.  
All point sources106 of pollution must comply with one of the federally set 
effluent limitations.  New sources are subject to the new source standard, 
which is defined as “a standard for the control of the discharge of pollutants 
which reflect[s] the greatest degree of effluent reduction which the 
Administrator determines to be achievable through application of the best 
available demonstrated control technology.”107  Existing sources are subject 
to effluent limitations determined by reference to the best practicable 
control technology (BPT),108 or the best available technology (BAT).109  All 
three of these standards are set for categories of sources rather than for 
individual sources, but the Clean Water Act does allow variances to be 
granted in certain instances when plants cannot meet the relevant 
performance standard.110  In all cases, the requirement is the meeting of the 
maximum permissible level of effluents, not the use of any particular 
technology. 
As with the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act does not impose 
performance standards when it would be difficult to measure the level of 
effluents, as is the case with nonpoint source pollution.111  Rather than 
imposing effluent limitations, “measures designed to curtail nonpoint 
source pollution typically focus upon the regulation of inputs.”112  State 
management programs are required to develop “best management practices” 
aimed at the most common nonpoint sources.113  But while best 
 
104  Id. (quoting 38 Fed. Reg. 8820, 8821 (Apr. 6, 1973)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
105  Id. 
106  The Clean Water Act defines point source as “any discernible, confined and discrete 
conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, 
container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from 
which pollutants are or may be discharged.”  33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2006). 
107  § 1316(a)(1).  See CPC Int’l Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032, 1045 n.25 (8th Cir. 1975) (citing S.  
REP. NO. 92-414, at 1477 (1971)). 
108  § 1311(b)(1)(A)(i). 
109  Id. § 1311(b)(2)(A)(i). 
110  REVESZ, supra note 78, at 535 (“The three main types of variances are § 301(c) variances 
(allowing modifications of BAT standards on the basis of economic capability), § 301(g) variances 
(allowing modification to BAT standards on water quality grounds), and fundamentally different factor 
(FDF) variances (allowing modifications to individual point sources that demonstrate characteristics that 
are fundamentally different from those which define the category in which the source is placed).”). 
111  In the case of “point sources” the pollution comes out of a “discernible, confined and discrete 
conveyance,” § 1362(14).  Typically, the pollution comes out of a pipe.  Nonpoint sources, in contrast, 
are typically agricultural or urban runoff.  See REVESZ, supra note 78, at 545–46. 
112  Id. at 546. 
113  Id. 
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management practices are not performance standards, they are not design 
standards either because they focus on the use of inputs, such as the amount 
of fertilizer that can be used on agricultural land.114  Thus, these regulations 
deal with nondurable precautions for which transition relief is undesirable 
under both Kaplow’s and Shavell’s analyses. 
In summary, the major environmental statutes use performance 
standards to a much greater extent than design standards.  Given this 
significant feature of the regulatory regime, parties can choose to utilize 
more stringent pollution technology than is required by current 
regulations.115  In a world of no transition relief, if an actor believed that the 
legal standard would change in the future—due to technological 
developments or new information regarding the harm of the regulated 
activity—it might voluntarily reduce its emissions by purchasing new 
technology such that it was actually “overcomplying” with the current 
regulations.  In that way, it would save having to purchase technology 
twice: once to meet the current standard and again to meet the more 
stringent future standard that would apply to it in the absence of 
grandfathering.  And even if the newly developed “end-of-pipe” technology 
was too expensive, the actor could instead limit its emissions by making 
changes to its production process.116  For example, a plant using high-sulfur 
coal could decide to switch to low-sulfur coal in anticipation of more 
stringent pollution regulations.117 
Indeed, in the climate change context, we have already seen examples 
of industry actors voluntarily reducing their greenhouse gas emissions, even 
though a comprehensive climate change regulatory regime has not yet been 
enacted.118  For example, the Walt Disney Company and over two hundred 
other large companies have pledged to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.119  
In 2005, General Electric launched its “Ecomagination” plan, a public 
 
114  Id. at 515, 546. 
115  Id. at 546. 
116  See RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH 135–37 (2008) 
(noting that switching production processes can be a cheaper method of complying with pollution 
regulations than purchasing end-of-pipe technology). 
117  Id. at 136–37. 
118  See, e.g., Jeff Civins, Mary Mendoza & Adam Sencenbaugh, Environmental Due Diligence—
Counting Carbon, 24 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 37, 38 (2009) (“Driven by a variety of stakeholders, 
and perhaps in anticipation of upcoming regulation, many sources of GHG emissions have undertaken 
voluntary measures to reduce CO2 and other GHGs attributable to their operations.”); see also 
Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed. Reg. 6290, 6291 (Feb. 
8, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 211, 231, 241) (discussing potential for future climate change 
regulation and noting “increasing calls for climate-related disclosures by shareholders of public 
companies”). 
119  Civins et al., supra note 118, at 38–39 (noting that in addition to reducing emissions from 
stationary sources, which are most likely to be regulated, companies are also voluntarily taking efforts to 
reduce their overall carbon footprint). 
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relations and investment campaign that pledged to improve the efficiency of 
the company’s energy usage by 30% by 2012.120  Walmart has begun 
experimenting with solar panels for new stores,121 Citigroup has announced 
plans to cut its global emissions of greenhouse gases by 10% by 2012,122 
Google has installed a solar rooftop on its California headquarters,123 and 
Goldman Sachs has created a research team, GS Sustain, to specifically 
identify companies with a commitment to sustainability that present 
promising investment opportunities.124 
More generally, in response to this increasing awareness among 
shareholders of the importance of reducing GHG emissions, the Chicago 
Climate Exchange, a voluntary greenhouse gas reduction and offset trading 
platform whose members make a voluntary, legally binding emission 
reduction commitment, was created in 2003.125  In the first phase of the 
program, participating firms committed to lowering emissions by 1% per 
year for four years, until 2006.126  In the second phase, the firms agreed to 
continue to lower emissions for a total decrease below the original baseline 
of 6% by 2010.127  By the beginning of Phase II, over 300 companies had 
joined the Exchange.128  But as the prospects of climate legislation in the 
near future were dashed at the end of the 111th Congress, this market 
collapsed and the Chicago Climate Exchange put an end to the trading.129 
These examples show that even when actors are not promised 
substantial transition relief, they may rationally respond to future legislative 
changes by voluntarily altering their behavior to comply with a more 
 
120  See Jeffery Marshall, Corporate Social Responsibility: Hard Choices on Soft Issues, FIN. 
EXECUTIVE, July/Aug. 2005, at 44, 45–46; The Greening of General Electric: A Lean, Clean Electric 
Machine, ECONOMIST, Dec. 10, 2005, at 77; ECOMAGINATION, http://www.ecomagination.com (last 
visited Nov. 23, 2011) (describing the program and its success so far). 
121  See Paul Davidson, Wal-Mart to Double Solar Initiative, USA TODAY, Apr. 22, 2009, at 3B. 
122  Jim Carlton, Citigroup Tries Banking on the atural Kind of Green, WALL ST. J., Sept. 5, 2007, 
at B1. 
123  Greening of Google, SOLARIPEDIA, http://www.solaripedia.com/13/63/greening_of_google.html 
(last visited Aug. 11, 2011). 
124  See ANDREW HOWARD ET. AL, GOLDMAN SACHS, CHANGE IS COMING: A FRAMEWORK FOR 
CLIMATE CHANGE—A DEFINING ISSUE OF THE 21ST CENTURY 15 (2009), available at http://www2.
goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/gs-sustain/gs-sustain/climate-change-research-pdf.pdf. 
125  CHI. CLIMATE EXCH., OVERVIEW BROCHURE 3 (2008) (on file with authors) (listing one of the 
benefits of joining the exchange as the opportunity to “demonstrate unique commitment through a 
legally binding goal, to shareholders”). 
126  Id. at 2. 
127  Id.  If a special event requires a member to emit more than its allotted amount of emissions, the 
member can purchase a Carbon Financial Instrument contract (CFI) to offset the extra emissions 
released.  Id. 
128  Id. at 4. 
129  John Collins Rudolf, Cap-and-Trade Exchange Calls It Quits, N.Y. TIMES GREEN BLOG (Nov. 
17, 2010, 8:22 AM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/17/climate-futures-exchange-calls-it-quits 
(“With climate legislation in the United States dead in the water for the foreseeable future, participants 
in the exchange have lost interest . . . .”). 
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stringent standard that is socially desirable.  While these voluntary efforts 
may have also been motivated by a desire to improve public relations, they 
were likely motivated at least in part by investors’ concerns about future 
climate change regulation.130  In fact, the collapse of trading on the Chicago 
Climate Exchange supports the proposition that the threat of future 
regulation plays a role in firms’ decisions to anticipate future legal 
standards. 
B. Regulatory Delay 
Shavell also assumes that regulators will be able to quickly amend the 
legal standards once uncertainties about the nature of the harm are 
resolved.131  Given the inertia of Congress and the costs associated with 
notice-and-comment rulemaking by administrative agencies, this 
assumption is unrealistic.132 
1. Congress.—Even when it becomes known that an existing 
environmental measure is no longer socially optimal, it will often take 
Congress several years to respond to this new information and amend the 
statute.133  This delay is likely to occur even assuming that Congress acts 
consistently with a popular democracy model, under which it faithfully 
represents the interests of the citizenry.134  There are a number of reasons 
 
130  See Pet. for Interpretive Guidance on Climate Risk Disclosures at 8 (2007) (No. 4-547), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2007/petn4-547.pdf (“Investors of all types are aware 
that climate change, and greenhouse gas regulation, will have enormous implications for long-term 
capital investments that are being made right now by corporations.  They want to know how fully (if at 
all) companies are taking climate change into account in making those decisions.  They want to identify, 
and invest in, companies that are ‘out front’ in responding to climate risks and opportunities, and to 
avoid firms that are behind the curve.”); see also Andrew Schatz, Note, Regulating Greenhouse Gases 
by Mandatory Information Disclosure, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 335, 371 (2008) (discussing how investors 
are increasingly putting pressure on companies to disclose greenhouse gas emissions). 
131  See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
132  See Lynn E. Blais & Wendy E. Wagner, Emerging Science, Adaptive Regulation, and the 
Problem of Rulemaking Ruts, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1701, 1701 (2008) (“[W]hen new information threatens to 
unsettle existing regulatory requirements governing powerful stakeholders in the rulemaking process, 
using it to develop stricter environmental standards is unlikely to be a simple or straightforward 
matter.”). 
133  See Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to 
Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1180 (2009) (“The essentially conservative, fragmented, 
and deliberately cumbersome process for lawmaking in the United States does not readily lend itself to 
such responsive, iterative lawmaking initiatives.”); Donald Stever et al., Air Pollution Standards for 
Stationary Sources: Next Moves (Oct. 6, 2009), in 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10012, 10013 (2010) (“[W]e don’t 
want to go through a period like the 1980s again, when we waited around for Congress to pass what 
eventually became the 1990 [Clean Air Act] Amendments.”).  Delay may be particularly problematic in 
the environmental context given its “inherently dynamic nature.”  See Lazarus, supra, at 1180, 1227 
(“Environmental law’s inherently dynamic nature creates further obstacles in that multiple statutes, 
statutory amendments, and regulatory revisions are likely to be necessary over time.”). 
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why congressional enactment of new environmental standards may take 
significant time. 
First, Congress can tackle only a limited number of matters during a 
congressional session,135 and issues that are particularly salient to the 
American public are likely to capture Congress’s attention.  While 
environmental harms can have significant effects on public health, they 
might not be perceived as a priority if people lack information about these 
harms or improperly discount these harms because, as is the case with 
climate change,136 they are likely to cause problems only in the future.137  
Even when environmental issues do become momentarily salient, the 
public’s limited attention span can lead to an environmental statute being 
derailed in favor of another hot-button issue that might arise 
contemporaneously.138  For example, while climate change was discussed at 
length during the 2008 presidential election, concerns about health care and 
the struggling economy soon took center stage, leading Congress to at least 
temporarily put off considering climate change legislation.139 
Looking back at the history of the environmental statutes reveals that it 
often takes several years for Congress to revisit these statutes and pass 
amendments.  The Clean Air Act, originally passed in 1970, saw major 
 
134  See, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, Congress, Science, and Environmental Policy, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 
181, 222 (“The oldest model of congressional behavior, the popular democracy model, depicts a federal 
legislator as the direct representative or agent of the people.”).  We will consider a less representative 
model of Congress when we discuss interest group theory and public choice pathologies in Part V. 
135  See FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE: WHO WINS, WHO 
LOSES, AND WHY 22 (2009) (“The information environment in Washington is overwhelmingly complex, 
with thousands of bills being considered each year in Congress, hundreds of hearings occurring in more 
than a hundred different subcommittees, and public concerns moving from issue to issue at a rapid 
pace.”); RICHARD L. HALL, PARTICIPATION IN CONGRESS 24 (1996) (“Congressmen in committees 
simply have too much to do legislatively and too little time, energy, and other legislative resources to do 
it.  They cannot take on every issue; they must choose.”). 
136  See REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 116, at 108 (“[T]he benefits of mitigating climate change 
will occur in the future . . . .”). 
137  Of course, some environmental issues—such as hazardous waste disposal—are highly salient.  
See, e.g., Barry G. Rabe, Legislative Incapacity: The Congressional Role in Environmental Policy-
making and the Case of Superfund, 15 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 571, 576 (1990) (describing 
hazardous waste disposal as a “high-salience” issue, leading to the enactment of both the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)). 
138  See James J. Florio, Congress as Reluctant Regulator: Hazardous Waste Policy in the 1980’s, 3 
YALE J. ON REG. 351, 380 (1986) (noting that because of Congress’s “limited attention span,” regulatory 
programs may be subject to “long periods of stagnation”); see also BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 
135, at 22 (noting “scarcity of space on the public agenda”). 
139  Andrew C. Revkin, Global Warming, ASOCIACIÓN DE VOLUNTARIOS PARA EL SERVICIO EN 
AREAS PROTEGIDAS DE COSTA RICA, http://www.asvocr.org/english/noticias/index.php?subaction=
showfull&id=1268024383&archive=&start_from=&ucat=57& (last visited Aug. 11, 2011) (“[A] 
national preoccupation with the slow economy and competing issues, led by health care, threaten to 
delay or weaken [climate change] legislation.”). 
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amendments 1977 and 1990,140 and the Clean Water Act, originally passed 
in 1972, saw major amendments in 1977 and 1987.141  Thus, while a 
particular environmental statute might be revisited every decade or so, it is 
unlikely to be immediately amended upon the discovery of new 
information. 
Second, before Congress even focuses on particular issues as a 
collective body, these issues generally must first be considered by 
congressional committees and subcommittees.  Often, several committees 
exercise overlapping jurisdiction, adding to the delay at the committee 
level.142  When different committees hold separate hearings and recommend 
different versions of bills, the bills that do reach the full Congress tend to be 
more complex and their enactment is therefore likely to be significantly 
delayed.143  For example, despite its salience, the passage of hazardous 
waste legislation—the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 
1986 (SARA)—was significantly delayed because “five [House] 
committees and a series of subcommittees [were] repeatedly bogged down 
in disputes.”144 
Third, moving away from a public-interest vision of congressional 
action, industry lobbying can also delay the enactment of environmental 
legislation.  Especially when environmental legislation imposes high costs 
on certain industries, those industries’ trade associations have a strong 
incentive to lobby Congress against stringent measures, even if those 
measures are socially desirable.145  One standard argument, which tends to 
 
140  Stever et al., supra note 133, at 10013 (suggesting that congressional delay caused amendments 
to the Clean Air Act discussed in the 1980s to not actually be adopted until 1990). 
141  Ari N. Sommer, Note, Taking the Pit Bull off the Leash: Siccing the Endangered Species Act on 
Climate Change, 36 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 273, 283 n.80 (2009) (“The Clean Water Act (CWA) was 
passed in its modern form in 1972, with significant amendments in 1977 and 1987.”). 
142  Rabe, supra note 137, at 573 (“This transformation [from committee to subcommittee 
governance] enabled multiple House subcommittees to explore the same policy area, compounding the 
historical problems of overlapping committee jurisdiction.”); see also Lazarus, supra note 133, at 1181 
(“Fragmentation of congressional committee jurisdiction over environmental issues is inevitable given 
the ways in which ecological cause and effect span so many diverse human activities.”). 
143  See Rabe, supra note 137, at 573 (“Multiple hearings and bill referrals became commonplace, 
resulting . . . in the enactment of fewer laws and the submission of fewer reports to the full 
House. . . .  However, those laws that were passed were longer and more complex.”); see also Lazarus, 
supra note 133, at 1180 (“Securing passage of environmental law . . . .  requires multiple debates.”). 
144  Rabe, supra note 137, at 576. 
145  See, e.g., Eric Biber, Climate Change and Backlash, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1295, 1319 (noting 
that socially desirable environmental regulations often impose concentrated costs on particular 
industries, thus giving them an incentive to resist the regulation); Krista Yee, “A Period of 
Consequences”: Global Warming Legislation, Cooperative Federalism, and the Fight Between the EPA 
and the State of California, 32 ENVIRONS: ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 183, 200 (2008) (“Global warming 
legislation often impacts the automobile industry, forcing manufacturers to create new cars in 
compliance with recently enacted environmental standards, sometimes at great cost.  Thus, from a 
business perspective, it is natural for the automobile industry to resist new environmental legislation.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
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resonate with members of Congress, is that stringent regulation will result 
in a loss of American jobs.146  Lobbyists often also hire their own experts to 
testify before Congress and dispute the scientific research supporting 
proposed legislation, potentially persuading some members to oppose the 
initiative and to try to block its passage.147  Finally, if lobbyists represent 
companies that make substantial donations to congressional and senatorial 
campaign funds, members of Congress, fearing that they will endanger this 
important source of revenue, might be reluctant to support measures that 
will harm the economic interests of those companies, even if those 
measures enjoy broad public support and are backed by solid scientific 
evidence. 
In several important instances, Congress has delayed implementing 
environmental standards as a result of industry pressure.  The automobile 
emission standards provide a good example: as one commentator has noted, 
“[f]ederal law required dramatic reductions in auto emissions in the 1970 
[Clean Air Act], independent from California’s actions, yet industry 
pressure led Congress to postpone the standards twice.”148 
Of course, interest-group theory also suggests that there are reasons 
why industry might sometimes support federal environmental regulation.  
For example, an industry might prefer a uniform federal standard over 
conflicting standards across the fifty states.149  Also, a firm might favor 
more stringent environmental standards if it can meet these standards more 
cheaply than its competitors.150  Nonetheless, it is the case that interest 
groups can contribute to the slow pace of environmental legislation. 
 
146  Even if environmental legislation has numerous benefits, members of Congress tend “to weigh 
the prospect of potential losses more heavily than the possibility of gains” and thus may be wary about 
passing legislation “that may generate unintended and deleterious consequences” even when the 
legislation is also likely to produce beneficial results.  BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 135, at 114. 
147  See Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 DUKE 
L.J. 1321, 1325–26, 1329 (2010) (discussing the problem of information capture, noting that because 
“[a]dministrative law . . . imposes almost no filtering requirements . . . on any of the participants who 
engage in the rulemaking,” well-financed interest groups can “gain[] control over regulatory 
decisionmaking in informal rulemakings” through “the excessive use of information . . . [and a] 
continuous barrage of letters, telephone calls, meetings, follow-up memoranda, formal comments, post-
rule comments, petitions for reconsideration, and notices of appeal”). 
148  Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1117 
(2009). 
149  See E. Donald Elliott, Bruce A. Ackerman & John C. Millian, Toward a Theory of Statutory 
Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 329 (1985); see also 
Carlson, supra note 148, at 1111 (“Elliott, Ackerman, and Millian theorize that this federal legislation 
[regulating automobile emissions] came about largely because automobile manufacturers, along with the 
coal industry, feared inconsistent and potentially more stringent regulations from state and local 
governments.”). 
150  See, e.g., ACKERMAN & HASSLER, supra note 82, at 11 n.*, 31; Michael G. Faure & Jason Scott 
Johnston, The Law and Economics of Environmental Federalism: Europe and the United States 
Compared, 27 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 205, 273 (2009) (“[I]ndustry in countries with a high demand for 
environmental protection would lobby to impose tough standards on competitors in other jurisdictions, 
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2. Agencies.—Even when regulatory policy is delegated to agencies, 
which might be thought to be more flexible than Congress, significant delay 
is likely to occur.  Like Congress, agencies cannot immediately respond to 
new information given the variety of taxing procedural hurdles of notice-
and-comment rulemaking, which is the vehicle for the adoption of most of 
the important environmental regulations.151  This phenomenon, referred to 
as agency ossification, has received extensive scrutiny in the administrative 
law literature.152  All three branches contribute to this phenomenon.  The 
executive branch requires agencies to perform cost–benefit analyses of 
major rules and subjects them to Office of Management and Budget 
review.153  Congress sometimes requires agencies to perform procedures 
beyond what is required in the Administrative Procedure Act in order to 
enact rules,154 and the judiciary has developed a “hard look” jurisprudence 
under which it strikes down agency rules that are not accompanied by an 
agency report “discuss[ing] in detail each of scores of policy disputes, data 
disputes, and alternatives to the [adopted] rule,”155 and responding to 
relevant comments.156  
Ossification has also been extensively discussed in the context of 
environmental regulatory policy.  Despite advances in science and 
technology, it can take years for new rules to be enacted and for old rules to 
be amended given the stringent procedures.  An oft-cited report suggests 
that it takes the EPA five years to adopt a rule.157  A more recent study of 
rulemaking in the context of both the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water 
Act confirms that rulemaking proceeds at a much slower pace than 
technological advancement.158  Writing in the context of the Clean Air Act, 
 
thus benefiting from their higher levels of environmental regulation by effectively creating barriers to 
entry.”). 
151  See David Schoenbrod, Goals Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of the Clean Air Act, 30 
UCLA L. REV. 740, 812–13 (1983) (“A supposed advantage of delegation is that delegated authorities 
can respond more quickly than Congress to significant new information.  Practice under the Clean Air 
Act, however, has proved far different than theory.”). 
152  See Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE 
L.J. 1385 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 
59 (1995).  For examples in more general works, see STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS 
CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 48 (1995); Blais & Wagner, supra note 132, at 1704–
06; Daniel T. Deacon, Note, Deregulation Through onenforcement, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 795, 825–26 
(2010). 
153  Pierce, supra note 152, at 62. 
154  Id. at 64. 
155  Id. at 65. 
156  Id. at 84. 
157  CARNEGIE COMM’N ON SCI., TECH., & GOV’T, RISK AND THE ENVIRONMENT: IMPROVING 
REGULATORY DECISION MAKING 108 (1993). 
158  Blais & Wagner, supra note 132, at 1715–25 (“EPA is not revising standards frequently, 
and . . . when it does revise its standards, it is not necessarily because of advances in pollution-control 
technologies.”). 
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David Schoenbrod explains that the requirements on agencies are so taxing 
that it can take several years to adjust a rule in response to new information: 
Suppose there were a significant new discovery about a pollutant suggesting 
that it is much less or much more dangerous than previously 
thought. . . .  Under the Clean Air Act, however, [this] information would 
require a rule-making procedure to change the applicable national ambient air 
quality standards, state proceedings to adjust the applicable state plans, and 
then federal approval or disapproval of each state plan revision.  Even if 
judicial review of ambient air standards and state plans did not slow down the 
administrative process, the entire process would take several years and 
probably far more.159 
In addition to the procedural difficulties associated with notice-and-
comment rulemaking, the presence of organized interest groups is likely to 
further delay the development of new rules and the amendment of old 
rules.160  In the environmental context, trade associations representing 
polluters in a particular industry are likely to oppose changes that would 
strengthen emission and effluent standards.  As a result, these standards will 
likely not be amended as frequently as would be socially optimal.161 
In summary, there is likely to be substantial delay between the time at 
which uncertainties about the harmful effect of an activity are resolved and 
the time at which legal changes are enacted.  As a result, if there was no 
expectation of grandfathering, a new actor entering a regulated activity 
might rationally choose to purchase more expensive, higher performing 
technology than is required by current regulations if recent information 
made it sufficiently likely that the legal standard would be changed and the 
actor had knowledge of this information.  That way, it would avoid having 
to purchase two different pollution control technologies instead of just one.  
In contrast, in a world in which generous grandfathering policies 
accompany legal changes, a new actor would have no incentive to purchase 
more expensive technology, even if it was apparent that a strengthening of 
the regulatory regime was afoot. 
C. Imperfect Regulation 
In addition to assuming that regulators will quickly amend the legal 
standards in response to new information, Shavell assumes a world of 
perfect regulation where regulators set standards optimally in light of the 
current estimates of the as-yet-unknown magnitude of risks.162  We argue 
 
159  Schoenbrod, supra note 151, at 812–13 (footnote omitted). 
160  See Amy Whritenour Ando, Waiting to be Protected Under the Endangered Species Act: The 
Political Economy of Regulatory Delay, 42 J.L. & ECON. 29, 30, 45–48, 52 (1999) (using empirical 
analysis to demonstrate how interest group pressure delays endangered species listings). 
161  Blais & Wagner, supra note 132, at 1713–15. 
162  Shavell, supra note 2, at 79–80 (“[B]y the design of the regulators, present regulated behavior 
will in principle appropriately reflect all possible future changes in the world.  In the model that I 
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that regulated parties often possess superior information about the risks of 
the regulated activity and thus are better able to assess future risks than 
regulators.  We also contend that the legal framework considered by 
Shavell—where regulations are set before the magnitude of the risk is 
known—is at odds with the existing administrative law framework.  Indeed, 
it is likely that the courts would reject standards that are based on 
information deemed to be too speculative. 
As the administrative law literature reveals, regulated parties often 
possess more information about the risks of the regulated activity than 
regulators.163  Even putting to one side the inertia of Congress and 
administrative agencies discussed in section B, it is often the case that new 
information is discovered by the regulated actors in the course of ongoing 
research regarding their own business before it is discovered by the 
government.  Thus, when actors know that they will not be shielded from 
the effects of legal changes, they are more likely to change their behavior in 
light of new information that the government has not yet uncovered.  For 
example, Levmore suggests that because industry actors are generally in a 
better position than the government to evaluate the risks associated with 
their activities, a policy of no transition relief can induce them to 
voluntarily respond to new risks that the government is not even aware of, 
such as the risk that a particular chemical is more dangerous than was 
originally thought.164 
Also, given certain features of administrative law, regulators are often 
forced to develop imperfect legal standards that do not reflect their 
estimates about how current uncertainties will be resolved in the future.  
Agencies are typically tasked with setting regulatory standards, but these 
determinations are subject to judicial review.165  While some courts defer to 
agency determinations even when those determinations are based on 
estimates of harms of still-uncertain magnitude,166 other courts will strike 
 
examined, for example, the level of precaution chosen by the regulators to be the legal standard in 
period 1 impounds correctly all possible future changes in harm in period 2.”). 
163  See Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental Law to Produce 
eeded Information on Health and the Environment, 53 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1641–42 (2004). 
164  See Levmore, supra note 44, at 1659. 
165  The standard of review for agency regulations depends on the relevant statute.  For example, the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has the burden of demonstrating that it 
developed regulations based upon substantial evidence—a more demanding standard of review than the 
“arbitrary and capricious” standard.  See Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 
607, 705 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“This standard represents a legislative judgment that 
regulatory action should be subject to review more stringent than the traditional ‘arbitrary and 
capricious’ standard for informal rulemaking.”). 
166  See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1266 
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (“As for technological feasibility, we know that we cannot require of OSHA anything 
like certainty.  Since ‘technology-forcing’ assumes the agency will make highly speculative projections 
about future technology, a standard is obviously not infeasible solely because OSHA has no hard 
evidence to show that the standard has been met.”). 
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down regulations that are based on evidence they deem to be too 
speculative.167  In Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum 
Institute (The Benzene Case), the Supreme Court held that in order to 
decrease the exposure limit on airborne concentrations of benzene from the 
standard of ten parts of benzene per million parts of air (10 ppm) to one part 
per million (1 ppm), OSHA had to “show, on the basis of substantial 
evidence, that it is at least more likely than not that long-term exposure to 
10 ppm of benzene presents a significant risk of material health 
impairment” notwithstanding the agency’s argument that this approach 
“would render it helpless, forcing it to wait for the leukemia deaths that it 
believes are likely to occur before taking any regulatory action.”168  And in 
Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus—where industry challenged a 
proposed performance standard under the Clean Air Act as not being 
“adequately demonstrated”169—the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit held that while a regulator “may make a projection based on 
existing technology, . . . that projection is subject to the restraints of 
reasonableness and cannot be based on ‘crystal ball’ inquiry.”170  Especially 
when standards are being put into effect immediately, “the latitude of 
[future] projection[s] is correspondingly narrowed.  If actual tests are not 
relied on, but instead a prediction is made, ‘its validity as applied to this 
case rests on the reliability of the prediction and the nature of the 
assumptions.’”171 
Because agencies realize that their findings are subject to judicial 
scrutiny, they will often opt for less stringent standards they can more easily 
defend rather than more stringent standards that may better reflect future 
uncertainties.172   
 
167  See, e.g., Indus. Union Dep’t, 448 U.S. at 652–53, 662 (holding that OSHA must demonstrate “a 
significant risk of material health impairment” before issuing standards); Gulf S. Insulation v. U.S. 
Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, 701 F.2d 1137, 1146 (5th Cir. 1983) (overturning formaldehyde 
regulation because “it is not good science to rely on a single experiment, particularly one involving only 
240 subjects, to make precise estimates of cancer risk. . . .  To make precise estimates, precise data are 
required.”); Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 391 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (“The 
Administrator may make a projection based on existing technology, though that projection is subject to 
the restraints of reasonableness and cannot be based on ‘crystal ball’ inquiry.” (quoting Int’l Harvester 
Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 629 (D.C. Cir. 1973)); Int’l Harvester Co., 478 F.2d at 645 (rejecting 
EPA’s assumption used to calculate lead adjustment factor as too speculative). 
168  See Industrial Union Dep’t, 448 U.S. at 652–53 (footnote omitted). 
169  See Portland Cement Ass’n, 486 F.2d at 379 (“The action of the Administrator has been 
challenged on [three] grounds . . . [including that] [t]he achievability of the standards was not adequately 
demonstrated.”); see also supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
170  Portland Cement Ass’n, 486 F.2d at 391 (quoting Int’l Harvester Co., 478 F.2d at 629). 
171  Id. at 392 (quoting Int’l Harvester Co., 478 F.2d at 642). 
172  See, e.g., Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALE J. 
ON REG. 89, 133 (1988) [hereinafter Latin, Good Science] (“[J]udicial requirements for comprehensive 
agency assessments of all potentially relevant factors and for a high degree of scientific precision have 
substantially emasculated environmental control programs in the past decade.”); Howard Latin, 
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As Howard Latin has observed: 
 If one examines administrative behavior realistically, there are numerous 
reasons why regulators would resist any statutory prescription to “guess.” EPA 
and other agencies must function in a setting where every factual finding, 
scientific inference, and policy choice is vigorously contested by affected 
parties. Agency judgments must also survive intensive judicial review in 
which regulators normally bear the burden of proving regulatory decisions are 
rational and supported by substantial evidence. If agencies concede they have 
had to guess, their decisions may become fair game for interest-group and 
media ridicule . . . . Environmental protection programs often entail high 
regulatory costs that agencies may be reluctant to impose on the basis of 
speculation, but that is precisely the effect of regulation under uncertainty.173 
We thus show that regulated actors may be better able to assess future 
risks than the regulators themselves and that regulators may be unable to 
develop optimal legal standards in the manner contemplated by Shavell’s 
model.  As a result, regulated actors may be induced to adopt more stringent 
pollution controls than those required by current regulations in anticipation 
of the future regulations likely to be implemented when the information 
possessed by the actors becomes available to regulators and is sufficiently 
certain to be acceptable to the courts.  If new legal standards are 
accompanied by grandfathering, however, regulated actors will never have 
an incentive to anticipate more stringent regulation because they are given 
guaranteed protection from the effects of such future regulation. 
D. Extending Shavell’s Model 
In this section, we extend the Shavell model to show why actors may 
in fact voluntarily adopt greater pollution reduction beyond that required by 
current legal standards if they anticipate the adoption of new, more stringent 
standards.  To Shavell’s two periods, we add a third.  To use Shavell’s 
example, suppose that in period one the level of harm is unknown and the 
existing source’s safety device, designed to comply with the then-existing 
regulatory standard, lowers the risk of harm to 7%.  In period two, the level 
of harm is determined to be $700,000 and the optimal precaution for a new 
source, in light of this harm, costs $20,000 and reduces the risk of harm to 
5%.  But unlike in Shavell’s example, suppose that the regulatory 
requirement applying to new sources is not adopted until period three, as a 
result of the delays discussed in Part II.B. 
 
Regulatory Failure, Administrative Incentives, and the ew Clean Air Act, 21 ENVTL. L. 1647, 1663 
(1991) [hereinafter Latin, Regulatory Failure] (noting that judicial review leads agencies to avoid 
regulating under uncertainty); Wagner, supra note 147, at 1422 (“Rather than focusing its energies on 
developing public-oriented regulatory policy, the agency finds instead that it must devote most of its 
analysis to preparing rules that can withstand fierce attack from an aggressive group of affected interests 
and respond to the flood of information loaded into the system by these same groups.”). 
173  Latin, Regulatory Failure, supra note 172, at 1663 (footnote omitted). 
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Now suppose that a new actor enters the regulated activity in period 
two and needs to decide what precautions to take.  The actor can take the 
precaution that meets the standard then in effect, or it can take what is then 
known to be the optimal precaution even though this level is not yet legally 
required.  As discussed in Part II.A, we assume that these standards take the 
form of performance standards.  Suppose that the precaution that meets the 
standard legally in effect in period two costs $15,000 (as opposed to the 
$20,000 cost of the optimal precaution).  The socially optimal choice would 
be for the actor to purchase the new technology in period two.  The total 
social cost would then be $20,000 + ($700,000 x 0.05) = $55,000.  In 
contrast, the total social cost over period two if the actor purchases the older 
technology would be $15,000 + ($700,000 x 0.07) = $64,000. 
The actor’s decision, however, is not determined by the social cost, but 
rather by the actor’s private cost, which is $5000 lower if it does not 
purchase the new technology.  Thus, an actor believing it would be 
grandfathered would make the socially undesirable choice by purchasing 
the old technology.  In contrast, if the actor believed that it would not 
benefit from grandfathering, it would make the socially optimal choice by 
purchasing the new technology.  Otherwise, it would end up spending 
$15,000 on the old technology in period two and an additional $20,000 on 
new technology in period three.174  As long as the present discounted value 
in period two of an expenditure of $20,000 in period three is more than 
$5000, the actor would be better off purchasing the new technology in 
period two if it did not expect to be grandfathered.175 
III. THE INEFFICIENCY OF OLD PLANTS OVER TIME 
While Shavell has made a compelling case for a policy of 
grandfathering in the context of durable precautions, he acknowledges that 
indefinite grandfathering is probably not optimal for two reasons.176  First, 
because equipment deteriorates over time, it becomes increasingly costly to 
maintain old plants and high maintenance costs “reduce[] the cost 
 
174  The choice would be different, of course, if the old technology could simply be upgraded for the 
$5000 difference in the cost of the technologies.  But just like we cannot upgrade our laptops by paying 
the difference between the cost of our obsolete three-year-old laptop and the cost of a new one with far 
greater computing power, typically this type of choice is also not available in the pollution-control 
context.  See infra text accompanying notes 187–91. 
175  One might argue that the regulator could consider the date when the actor entered the activity in 
determining whether to grandfather the actor.  That is, the regulator could choose to not grandfather 
entrants who should have adopted newer precautions.  In practice, however, this policy would be 
difficult to implement because the regulator would have to make assumptions about when this 
information was first known and would have to be able to defend the decision against the inevitable 
judicial challenges. 
176  Shavell, supra note 2, at 73 (“[U]nlimited duration of grandfathering of plants raises 
questions.”). 
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advantage of grandfathering.”177  Second, the advantages of taking pollution 
precautions may increase over time either because certain harms, such as 
the greenhouse effect, are understood to be more harmful than originally 
thought or because more cost-effective technology is developed.178  Shavell 
therefore implies that there will come a time when it will be socially 
desirable for old plants to comply with the new regulations either by 
transitioning to newer technology or by closing down.  He does not 
consider, however, that as long as the costs of shifting to new technology 
are an eventual necessity, it might be socially optimal to not grandfather at 
all so that society can benefit from the more socially desirable level of 
pollution at an earlier period.  Thus, at least in certain cases, it might be 
desirable to require existing plants to comply with new regulations. 
Let us return to Shavell’s example, discussed in Part I.C.1, and 
consider a source that is already participating in the activity in period one.  
A new standard is adopted in period two and would cost the source $20,000 
to come into compliance with this standard, which would reduce the risk of 
harm from 7% to 5%.  The level of harm, which had previously not been 
known, is determined in period two, to be $700,000.  As Shavell explains, it 
is socially desirable to grandfather this existing actor: the social cost of 
complying with the new standard would be $55,000 ($20,000 for the new 
technology plus a 5% probability of a $700,000 harm) whereas the social 
cost of not complying is $49,000 (a 7% probability of a $700,000 harm). 
Shavell acknowledges that there will come a time when the equipment 
degrades and the actor will have to purchase new equipment,179 but he does 
not analyze the consequences of this phenomenon.  Suppose that in period 
three, the equipment of the existing source has deteriorated so that, in order 
to keep the probability of the $700,000 harm limited to 7%,180 the source 
needs to expend $10,000 in maintenance costs. 
It then turns out that it would be socially optimal for the source to 
come into compliance in period three with the regulatory standard adopted 
in period two.  Indeed, the social cost of compliance is still $55,000 but the 
social cost of continued grandfathering is now $59,000 (a 7% probability of 
a $700,000 harm plus the $10,000 in maintenance costs).  But the source 
will not come into compliance with the regulatory standard unless it is 
required to do so, because the $10,000 in maintenance costs are lower than 
the $20,000 cost of the new pollution control equipment. 
At first glance, it might appear that the optimal regulatory policy is to 
grandfather the source in period two but to have the grandfathering end in 
period three.  But is such time-limited grandfathering actually desirable?   
Given the fact that the source will be required to buy the new pollution-
 
177  Id. 
178  Id. 
179  Id. 
180  We assume that the harm is $700,000 in each of the periods. 
105:1581  (2011) Regulatory Change 
 1615 
control equipment in period three, should it instead be required to buy it in 
period two?  The cost of doing so is no longer $20,000 because this amount 
will be expended anyway and the only question is whether the equipment is 
bought sooner rather than later. 
Instead, the additional cost of purchasing the equipment in period two 
rather than waiting until period three is the $20,000 that it would cost to buy 
it in period two minus the present discounted value in period two of 
expending $20,000 in period three (the amount saved by purchasing the 
equipment earlier).  If the difference between these two figures is less than 
$14,000—the difference between a 7% and a 5% probability of a $700,000 
harm in period two—then grandfathering in period two is not desirable 
either.  In other words, the deterioration of the source’s equipment in period 
three changed the calculus regarding the desirability of grandfathering not 
only in period three, but in period two as well. 
This example reveals that the determination of the desirability of 
grandfathering in one period cannot be made in isolation.  If we just look at 
period two, grandfathering appears to be desirable.  But the fact that 
grandfathering should not be extended in period three calls into question its 
desirability in period two as well.  More generally, the phenomenon we 
describe reduces the range of cases for which grandfathering is desirable. 
IV. JOINT DETERMINATION OF REGULATORY STANDARDS AND 
TRANSITION RELIEF 
So far, we have presented arguments that challenge some of the most 
prominent justifications for transition relief.  Our approach calls for turning 
the dial away from where Shavell left it, though not all the way to where the 
new view proponents had it. 
In this Part, we change course and develop a new approach for 
determining the desirability of grandfathering that directly addresses the 
central regulatory problem: stringent standards for new sources of pollution 
coupled with grandfathering create undesirable incentives for existing 
sources to remain in place.  In developing this argument, we add further 
support to our general skepticism of broad grandfathering provisions. 
The current literature proceeds from the mostly implicit assumption 
that decisions concerning grandfathering should take place in two steps.181  
 
181  The transition relief literature does not include detailed discussion about how new legal rules are 
selected, but it is implicit that new, prospective rules are those rules that would be optimal for new 
sources.  Shavell assumes at the outset that the newly adopted regulation is the one that is optimal for 
new entrants.  Shavell, supra note 2, at 48.  He then discusses which grandfathering policy would be 
socially optimal in light of the new rule.  Id.  Kaplow also implies that the new rule is selected in light of 
what is optimal for new actors.  He suggests that the new rule should be the rule we would want all 
existing sources to anticipate even in the face of uncertainty.  Kaplow, supra note 2, at 521.  He also 
assumes that the substantive policy decision is not affected by the choice of transition policy.  Id.  
(“[T]he discussion assumes that the reforms themselves are desirable at the time they are made. . . .  A 
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First, regulators should determine the optimal prospective rule by reference 
only to new sources constructed after the promulgation of the rule.  Second, 
in light of the choice of a prospective, new source standard, regulators 
should determine what grandfathering, if any, of existing sources is 
desirable. 
If one assumes, as Shavell does in his model,182 that the number of 
firms entering and exiting the activity is exogenous to the grandfathering 
rule, then the sequential approach makes sense.  However, because the 
grandfathering rule that is selected has a real impact on entry decisions, this 
approach is flawed.  If the grandfathering rule is so generous that all of the 
existing plants continue to operate, there may be no demand for additional 
plants, and no new plants (or few new plants) may actually come into 
existence.  Also, even though new plants are able to operate more 
efficiently than old plants, new plants may nonetheless be unable to 
compete with old plants because the new plants have to bear the costs of 
complying with new regulations while the old plants do not.  Even when, in 
the absence of regulatory standards, it would be efficient for old plants to 
shut down, they would continue running in the face of stringent regulations 
of new sources in order to avoid having to bear the costs of complying with 
new regulations.  Thus, a policy of imposing very stringent standards on 
new sources and grandfathering existing sources can have the effect of 
prolonging the existence of old plants and “discourag[ing] the introduction 
of those new sources that would be subject to their requirements,” a result 
known as the “old-plant effect.”183  In some circumstances, when old plants 
operate beyond their useful lives, the resulting environmental quality is 
actually worse than it would be with no regulation at all.184 
In a prior article, Jonathan Nash and Richard Revesz illustrated the 
decision of the owner of an existing plant, A, as follows: 
 
significant related assumption, implied by the stronger assumption just stated, is that substantive policy 
decisions are not themselves affected by the choice of transition policy.”). 
182  See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
183  Nash & Revesz, supra note 1, at 1708–09.  Several authors have provided an overview of the 
old-plant effect.  See ACKERMAN & HASSLER, supra note 82, at 67–68; Keohane, Revesz & Stavins, 
supra note 78, at 315 n.10; see also Howard K. Gruenspecht, Differentiated Regulation: The Case of 
Auto Emissions Standards, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 328, 328 (1982) (“The adoption of more stringent 
emissions standards for new vehicles is shown to prolong the retention of old, high-emission-rate 
vehicles in the fleet.”); Robert N. Stavins, Vintage-Differentiated Environmental Regulation, 25 STAN. 
ENVTL. L.J. 29, 41–56 (2006) (describing “effects of vintage-differentiated regulation on the lives of 
durable plant and equipment”); Richard Webster & Julia LeMense, Spotlight on Safety at uclear 
Power Plants: The View from Oyster Creek, 26 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 365, 367 (2009) (describing how 
NRC regulations which have only “increased the safety requirements for new plants” have produced a 
“trend . . . toward relicensing of old plants rather than replacement with new plants”). 
184  See, e.g., Stavins, supra note 183, at 43 (noting that vintage-differentiated regulation “can lead 
to short-term emissions increases” and that “when the sources subject to regulation have especially low 
rates of deterioration and technical obsolescence . . . the ‘short term’ is very long”). 
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 Say that the annual operating cost of an existing facility is $100, while—as 
one might expect because of the greater efficiencies offered by newer plants—
the annual operating cost of a new facility with the same production capacity is 
$90 (including annualized capital cost). . . .  A will chose to construct a new 
facility. 
 But now say that the applicable environmental regulation imposes costs of 
$20 if A constructs a new facility but no cost if A retains her existing facility.  
The modified annual operating cost of a new facility is $110, while the annual 
operating cost of the existing facility remains $100.  Accordingly, A will now 
opt to retain her existing facility in operation.185 
The example then shows why the stringent regulation of new sources 
can lead to perverse results: “Assume that the old plant emits five units of 
pollution per ton of output; that a new, unregulated plant would emit three 
units because of its greater efficiency; and that a new plant subject to 
regulation would emit one unit.”186  In this example, in the absence of 
regulation, the pollution would be three units because the old plant gets 
replaced by a new plant, but with the stringent regulation the pollution 
remains at five units because the old plant continues to operate. 
This example illustrates why the current approach to determining the 
desirability of grandfathering is seriously flawed.  It does not take into 
account the impact that the disparity between the regulatory stringency that 
applies to new sources and grandfathered sources has on the rate at which 
grandfathered sources close down and are replaced by new sources.  If this 
disparity is too great because the new source standards are far more 
stringent than the standards applying to grandfathered sources, 
grandfathered sources will continue operating for a longer time than they 
would in the absence of the stringent new source regulations.  Thus, there 
will not be demand for new sources and the stringent standard will exist 
only on paper; there will be no sources to which it actually applies, while 
the grandfathered standards persist for a long time. 
The current approach engages in sequential optimization.  It first picks 
the optimal standard for new sources, ignoring the presence of existing 
sources.  Then, it chooses the optimal level of grandfathering in light of the 
choice of the new source standard.  Instead, the correct approach to the 
problem would seek to jointly optimize the new source standard and the 
grandfathering rule.  Only in this manner can social welfare be maximized. 
The joint-optimization approach is likely to lead to a less stringent new 
source standard and a more limited grandfathering rule than the sequential 
optimization approach.  The first prong is necessary in order to provide 
sufficient incentive for existing sources to close down.  One might ask why 
that incentive should not be provided instead by denying grandfathering to 
 
185  Nash & Revesz, supra note 1, at 1710. 
186  Id. at 1711. 
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existing sources.  The reason is given by Shavell: in light of a stringent new 
source standard, grandfathering is sometimes optimal (though perhaps less 
often than Shavell claims because of the issues concerning the anticipation 
of new standards discussed in Part II).  Just as it is cheaper to purchase a 
new hybrid car than it would be to convert a gasoline-powered car into a 
hybrid car, it is almost always cheaper to impose stringent pollution 
regulations on plants that are being newly constructed than it is to impose 
such regulations on plants that have already been built and have already 
installed different pollution abatement equipment.187  Unlike a new plant, an 
old plant faces transition costs—such as removing previously installed 
safety devices (if any) and possibly retrofitting the plant so that it is 
compatible with new pollution abatement technology.188  Of course, the 
costs associated with requiring an old plant to comply with new regulations 
may be overstated because, at least with performance standards, an old 
plant could also meet the standards by makings changes to its production 
process, which may be cheaper than retrofitting the plant or implementing 
new pollution-control technology.189  For example, a plant could reduce its 
emissions by switching from high-sulfur coal to low-sulfur coal or from 
coal to natural gas.190  Even so, old plants will likely face higher costs than 
new plants.  Grandfathering existing actors will not always be optimal, but 
is appropriate when their compliance with the new rule would cost more 
“than the reduction in the expected harm” that would result from complying 
with the new rule.191 
As a result, the socially optimal approach is to pick not only a less 
stringent new source standard than would be ideal if there were no existing 
sources, but also a less generous transition rule than the one that results 
from the current, sequential approach.  Only through joint (as opposed to 
sequential) optimization can one achieve the socially optimal portfolio of 
new source standards and grandfathering rules. 
We now develop some examples to illustrate the nature of the problem. 
A. Example 1   
Let us return to Shavell’s initial example.  Recall that the old source, 
which operated in period one, produces a 7% risk of a harm of $700,000, 
 
187  See Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, 
Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 
431, 467 (1989) (“[T]he abatement system can be included in a new plant’s original design, but must be 
fit into an older plant.”); Stavins, supra note 183, at 30. 
188  See Peter Huber, The Old-ew Division in Risk Regulation, 69 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1027 (1983) 
(“[The regulation of old risks] therefore often faces large economic and social obstacles and incurs 
transition costs.”); Shavell, supra note 2, at 51–52 (discussing transition costs). 
189  REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 116, at 135–37. 
190  Id. at 136–37. 
191  Shavell, supra note 2, at 44–45. 
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yielding an expected harm of $49,000.  In period two, the optimal standard 
for a new plant leads to a risk of 5%, but it would cost $20,000 for the 
existing source to purchase the technology necessary to reduce risk to this 
level.  Shavell then shows that grandfathering is optimal because the total 
social cost of requiring the existing source to meet the new source standards 
would be  “20,000 + 5% x $700,000 = $55,000”192—more than the social 
cost of $49,000 that would result from grandfathering.  Now assume that 
the market demand is only for the goods produced by a single plant.  Then, 
no new plant would be constructed and the existing plant would remain in 
operation for a total social cost of $55,000. 
Consider what would happen if a less stringent new source standard 
was picked.  Let’s say that at a cost of $10,000 the existing source could 
reduce its risk of harm to 5.5%.  Would grandfathering then be optimal?  
The social cost of requiring the existing plant to meet the new standard 
would be $10,000 + 5.5% x $700,000 = $48,500—less than the social cost 
of $49,000 that results from continuing to operate the new plant.  Thus, in 
the face of a new source requirement of reducing the risk to 5.5%, it is 
optimal not to grandfather the existing source.  Additionally, the social cost 
here would be less than it would be under the more stringent standard.  So, 
the joint optimization approach that we advocate in this Article leads to a 
new source standard producing a risk of 5.5% and no grandfathering, 
whereas the sequential approach leads to a new source risk of 5% but 
grandfathers the existing source.193 
B. Example 2   
Example 1 should not be read to suggest that the lack of grandfathering 
is always optimal.  Indeed, now consider a situation in which there is one 
existing plant in operation but there is unmet demand for its product 
sufficient to justify the building of one new plant of the same size.  Again, 
the optimal standard for the new plant considered in isolation leads to a 5% 
risk of harm.  If this standard is set, one new plant will be built to meet the 
additional demand.  We know, from Shavell’s example and the discussion 
above, that it is desirable to grandfather the existing plant.  Would it be 
better, instead, to set the new source standard at 5.5%, in which case the 
optimal rule for the existing plant would be not to have grandfathering?  
The social harm produced by the existing plant would be less—$48,500 
instead of $49,000—but the new plant would produce greater social harms, 
 
192  Shavell, supra note 2, at 46. 
193  In all three examples, the question is whether the existing source should meet the new source 
standard or whether, instead, it should be grandfathered.  It is possible to design a regulatory scheme 
under which there is an additional option: the existing source could meet a standard that is less stringent 
than the one that applies to the new source but that leads to less risk than grandfathering.  Analyzing this 
additional option would complicate the examples but would not change the key argument of this Part: 
that sequential optimization does not produce the socially beneficial regulatory policy. 
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because by definition 5% is the risk level that minimizes that harm.  So, 
there is a tradeoff that must be considered.  The expected harm produced by 
the new source at a 5% risk is $35,000 whereas at a 5.5% risk it is $38,500.  
Say that it would be $3200 cheaper for the new source to reduce its risk to 
5.5% instead of 5%.  Thus, social welfare would be increased if the new 
source standard prescribed a risk of 5.5% instead of 5%.  The social cost 
imposed by the new plant would be $300 more at 5.5% than at 5%: the 
additional harm imposed would be $3500 greater but there would a 
resulting savings of $3200 in pollution control equipment.  But the social 
cost imposed by the existing plant would be $500 less.  Thus, the total 
social cost would be $200 less if the standard for the new source is set at a 
risk level of 5.5% instead of 5%.  So, in this example, as in the prior one, a 
regulatory standard for the new source prescribing a risk of 5.5% is 
preferable to one prescribing a risk of 5%.  And, in both cases, it is 
desirable not to grandfather existing sources. 
C. Example 3   
But now consider a situation in which it is only $2700 (rather than 
$3200) cheaper for the new source to give rise to a risk of 5.5% instead of 
5%.  Then the social cost imposed by the new plant would be $700 more 
and the social cost imposed by the existing plant would be only $500 less.  
As a result, it would be optimal to set the standard for the new plant at a 5% 
risk and to grandfather the existing plant. 
D. Example 4   
Finally, consider another situation, identical to Example 2, except that 
there is even more unmet demand so that the market could support three 
plants and there is only one existing plant, and where it is $3200 cheaper for 
a new source to meet a regulatory standard prescribing a 5.5% risk level 
instead of a 5% risk level.  As a result of the larger demand, there will be 
two new sources plus the existing source.  At a prescribed risk level of 
5.5%, each new source would impose social costs of $300 more than at a 
risk level of 5%, as in Example 2.  These additional social costs of $600 are 
now greater than the social cost savings of $500 if the existing source 
produces a risk of 5.5% instead of the status quo of 7%.  As a result, a new 
source standard prescribing a 5% risk is optimal as is a rule grandfathering 
the existing source. 
A full microeconomic analysis of our joint optimization approach is 
beyond the scope of this Article, but some important conclusions emerge 
from the preceding examples.  Most significantly, the optimal standard for 
new sources cannot be determined in isolation from the transition rule.  We 
have shown that in some cases it is desirable to compromise the stringency 
of the new source standards and to deny grandfathering to existing sources, 
even though grandfathering would have been desirable if the new source 
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standard had not been compromised.  In other cases, however, it is 
preferable not to compromise the new source standard and to grandfather 
existing sources.  The desirability of grandfathering depends on two 
important factors.  First, the greater the growth in demand for the product, 
the more likely it is that grandfathering would be desirable because the 
benefits of not compromising the new source standards will be more 
compelling the more new sources there are likely to be.  Accordingly, if the 
new source standard is not compromised, it is more likely that 
grandfathering the existing sources would be desirable.  In contrast, if 
demand is stagnant so that the existing sources are likely to satisfy the 
existing demand for the long term, it is better to compromise the new 
source standards and to deny grandfathering to the existing sources.  
Otherwise, the new source standard would be irrelevant because there will 
be no demand for new plants, and the existing source would pollute more 
than is socially optimal. 
Second, the period of time during which a grandfathered source 
continues in operation is also relevant.  The shorter that time, the less 
desirable it is to compromise the new source standard in order to make it 
socially preferable to deny grandfathering.  Indeed, the reduced social costs 
of this transition rule would lapse at the time that the grandfathered source 
would have closed down and would therefore be less likely to be sufficient 
to justify compromising the standard for new sources.  This discussion 
underscores the undesirability of extending grandfathering in midstream—
the common phenomenon described in Part V.C.  If the regulator had 
known ex ante that any grandfathering was likely to be extended in the 
future, it might have been able to increase social welfare by weakening the 
standards for new sources and denying grandfathering altogether.  Not 
knowing about this extension, the regulator would choose a new source 
standard and a grandfathering rule that, ex post, would become undesirable 
as a result of the extension of the grandfathering. 
V. PUBLIC CHOICE CONSIDERATIONS 
We now turn to public choice arguments advanced in favor of 
transition relief.  Many scholars have argued in favor of transition relief 
because it increases the likelihood that socially desirable legal changes will 
be enacted.194  Relatedly, J. Mark Ramseyer and Minoru Nakazato have 
 
194  See Eric Biber, Climate Change and Backlash, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1295, 1328 (2009) (noting 
that opposition to climate change legislation can “be bought off with grandfather exemptions and side-
payments”); David Dana & Susan P. Koniak, Bargaining in the Shadow of Democracy, 148 U. PA. L. 
REV. 473, 483–84 n.24 (1999) (“Grandfather clauses, in contrast to compensation payments, may well 
facilitate the passage of reform legislation.  When the legislature grandfathers current beneficiaries of a 
certain regulatory regime from new regulations, it reduces or eliminates the opposition of those 
beneficiaries without extracting money from some other interest group and entailing associated political 
costs.”); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., A Critical Reexamination of the Takings Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. 
REV. 1892, 1955 (1992) (“Absent the promise of compensation, a concentrated group will too often be 
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argued that transition relief is desirable because it can reduce wasteful 
public choice expenditures.195  If interest groups will be harmed by the 
repeal of an existing law or the passage of a new law, they may expend 
fewer resources opposing the initiative if it will be accompanied by 
transition relief for those groups.  From a societal perspective, it is desirable 
to avoid these expenditures because, as Gordon Tullock has noted, “[t]hese 
expenditures . . . are spent not in increasing wealth, but in attempts to 
transfer or resist transfer of wealth.”196 
In this Part, we begin in section A by presenting the main public choice 
arguments for transition relief and discussing some of the responses that 
have been made in the literature.  In section B we argue that, contrary to 
some of the dominant claims in the literature, public choice considerations 
might caution against providing generous transition relief when there is 
 
able to block even those concentrated-dispersed measures that would benefit society as a whole.  By 
promising compensation, and thereby replacing the concentrated group with a dispersed group, the 
Court would make enactment of these measures more likely.”); Stavins, supra note 183, at 34 
(“[G]randfathering is likely to be a politically expedient option for legislators . . . .  By limiting the 
scope of regulation to new capital assets, the burden of regulatory compliance is concentrated on a small 
subset of the electorate and the cost is transferred to unspecified, future ‘new sources.’”). 
195  See Ramseyer & Nakazato, supra note 48, at 1171–73.  We use the term “public choice 
expenditures” to refer to expenses aimed at influencing governmental officials to adopt particular 
positions on policy issues.  These include campaign contributions, salaries for lobbyists who meet with 
government officials, and expenses for informational purposes such as commissioning studies in order to 
bolster the interest group’s position.  Sometimes the academic literature uses the term “lobbying” to 
refer only to the transmission of information to political officials for the purposes of accomplishing a 
particular policy goal, thus excluding campaign contributions.  See Frank R. Baumgartner & Beth L 
Leech, The Multiple Ambiguities of “Counteractive Lobbying,” 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 521, 529 (1996).  
However, some authors define lobbying more broadly to include campaign contributions.  See JEFFREY 
M. BERRY, LOBBYING FOR THE PEOPLE: THE POLITICAL BEHAVIOR OF PUBLIC INTEREST GROUPS 263 
(1977) (describing four strategies of lobbying: law, confrontation, information, and constituency 
influence which includes campaign contributions).  For a description of case studies measuring the 
influence of interest groups, see FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER & BETH L. LEECH, BASIC INTERESTS: THE 
IMPORTANCE OF GROUPS IN POLITICS AND IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 120–46 (1998).  For an overview of 
the game theoretical literature on interest groups, see Jan Potters & Frans van Winden, Models of 
Interest Groups: Four Different Approaches, in COLLECTIVE DECISION-MAKING: SOCIAL CHOICE AND 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 337–62 (Norman Schofield ed., 1996) (discussing four models of interest groups: 
models employing an influence function, models employing a vote function, models employing a 
composite utility function, and models focusing on the transmission of information). 
196  Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224, 228 
(1967).  There are three types of rent-seeking expenditures that are generally considered socially 
wasteful: “The efforts and expenditures of the potential recipients of the monopoly[,] . . . [t]he efforts of 
the government officials to obtain or to react to the expenditures of the potential recipients[,] . . . [and] 
[t]hird-party distortions induced by the monopoly itself or the government as a consequence of the rent-
seeking activity.”  DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III 334 (2003) (citing James M. Buchanan, 
Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking, in TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY 12–14 (James 
M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison, & Gordon Tullock eds., 1980)).  Of course, as Ramseyer and 
Nakazato acknowledge, “resources spent in . . . lobbying do produce a social good to the extent they 
create accurate information about the effects of . . . reform.”  Ramseyer & Nakazato, supra note 48, at 
1171–72 n.44. 
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regulatory change.  In section C, we present empirical evidence that 
supports our argument by discussing lobbying efforts to extend the Clean 
Air Act’s grandfathering provisions. 
A. Public Choice Arguments Advanced in Favor of Transition Relief 
Various scholars have suggested that transition relief may be desirable 
given certain public choice realities.197  An argument commonly advanced 
in favor of transition relief is that it may be politically necessary to include 
transition relief in new legislation in order to overcome opposition to this 
legislation.198  Thus, even if the socially optimal regulatory policy would not 
involve transition relief, it is better to adopt a new policy with transition 
relief than to fail to adopt a new policy altogether.  Saul Levmore notes 
that: 
Legislatures . . . can engage in the strategic and selective protection of new 
losers. . . .  [W]here losers have sufficient power to delay or block desirable 
change, winners (including the polity as a whole) [may] find it worthwhile to 
compensate losers in order to go forward with good new law.199   
Indeed, we have seen examples of desirable environmental legislation 
that probably would not have been enacted without transition relief.  For 
example, the tradable-permit program established under the Clean Air Act 
to combat acid rain allocates permits for sulfur dioxide emissions to current 
polluters at no charge.200  While it would probably have been more socially 
desirable to initially allocate permits through auction,201 allocating permits 
through grandfathering probably made the program politically viable.202 
A related argument made in favor of providing transition relief is that 
transition relief can reduce wasteful lobbying expenses.  Ramseyer and 
Nakazato—focusing on transition relief in the context of tax reform203—
argue that guaranteeing transition relief is desirable in that it can decrease 
rent seeking.204  If Congress is considering the repeal of an existing tax 
benefit, those groups currently benefiting from the tax benefit have a strong 
incentive to lobby against the repeal.205  “In so doing, some will kill tax 
reform altogether, some will obtain a grandfather clause for their members, 
 
197  See supra note 194. 
198  See id. 
199  Levmore, supra note 44, at 1665–66. 
200  See Keohane, Revesz & Stavins, supra note 78, at 317. 
201  Id. at 316. 
202  See Brennan Van Dyke, Note, Emissions Trading to Reduce Acid Deposition, 100 YALE L.J. 
2707, 2720 (1991) (noting that initially allocating permits through a system of grandfathering “has one 
great advantage over an auction scheme: its political appeal to influential interest groups”). 
203  Ramseyer & Nakazato, supra note 48, at 1158. 
204  Id. at 1171–73. 
205  See id. at 1171 (“They will pay honoraria, organize grass-roots political organizations, and 
contribute to campaigns; to protect their projects from reform, they will coax, cajole, and bribe.”). 
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and some will simply fail.  To the extent they can organize, however, they 
will fight.”206  In order to mount a fight against tax reform, a great deal of 
time, money, and resources are wasted: “The amount these groups spend to 
fight tax change is partially a loss, and partially a transfer of wealth to 
legislators.”207  They argue that promising transition relief in advance results 
in less wasteful lobbying.208 
For example, suppose that, in an effort to encourage the use of solar 
energy, Congress grants a tax credit to those investing in such energy.  At 
the time Congress enacts this law, it also promises to grandfather the tax 
benefit for the life of the solar energy investment, and in the event of 
“breach,” agrees to pay “damages” in the form of a lump-sum payment 
equal to the net present value of the tax benefit.209  In this case, Ramseyer 
and Nakazato argue that wasteful lobbying expenditures are less likely to 
occur at the stage where the credit is repealed, because Congress has 
guaranteed that the beneficiaries of the existing tax credit are protected 
against the negative consequence of a repeal.210  When promised transition 
relief in advance, beneficiaries of tax legislation will no longer care if the 
law is repealed or maintained because either way they will receive the same 
benefits. 
Shaviro, however, questions whether the promise of transition relief 
will actually result in a net reduction in lobbying expenses.211  He points out 
that there may just be a tradeoff between enactment lobbying expenditures 
(expenses occurring when the tax benefit is first granted) and postenactment 
lobbying expenditures (expenses occurring when the tax benefit is being 
repealed, directed at protecting the benefit).212  In the case of a “tax-
guaranteed”213 approach, where actors have been promised transition relief 
with the initial legislation in the event of repeal, we would expect to see 
more enactment lobbying and less postenactment lobbying.214  And in the 
case of a “tax-contingent”215 approach, where actors are not initially 
 
206  Id. 
207  Id. (footnote omitted). 
208  Id. at 1171–73. 
209  Id. at 1167–68. 
210  Id. at 1172.  Congress would essentially agree that, in the event of a repeal, beneficiaries of the 
tax benefit would receive a “lump sum equal to the net present value of the expected, but as-yet-
uncollected, tax benefit[].”  Id. at 1168. 
211  SHAVIRO, supra note 2, at 74–75. 
212  Id. at 74–81. 
213  See Ramseyer & Nakazato, supra note 48, at 1171 (defining “tax-guaranteed strategy” as “a 
promise to grandfather, coupled with a promise to pay damages for breach”). 
214  SHAVIRO, supra note 2, at 74–81. 
215  See Ramseyer & Nakazato, supra note 48, at 1171 (defining “tax-contingent strategy” as “Graetz 
and Kaplow’s never-grandfather strategy”). 
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promised transition relief, we would expect more postenactment lobbying 
and less enactment lobbying.216 
Like Shaviro, Kaplow argues that public-choice considerations paint a 
more complicated picture than that described by Ramseyer and Nakazato 
and suggests that such considerations actually support his position against 
transition relief.217  He explains that the strategy advocated by Ramseyer 
and Nakazato, where groups are promised transition relief in advance, 
would increase the amount of inefficient, undesirable legislation.218  If 
regulated parties know they will benefit from grandfathering, they have a 
strong incentive to lobby for inefficient regulation that creates barriers to 
entry and thus gives them a competitive advantage.219  He also contends that 
if transition relief is the norm when policies that bestow special benefits are 
repealed, then the special interests’ “incentive to lobby for such policies 
will be increased.”220  Thus, in addition to leading to the enactment of an 
 
216  SHAVIRO, supra note 2, at 74–81.  However, Ramseyer and Nakazato dismiss the concern that 
greater enactment-period lobbying expenses might offset the reduced postenactment lobbying costs:  
When Congress decides to grant tax benefits to promote investment, it could either guarantee the 
benefits or keep then [sic] contingent.  All else equal, however, rational investors will consider 
only the expected net present value of those benefits when deciding how much to invest.  As a 
result, when comparing the enactment-period lobbying costs generated by the tax-contingent and 
tax-guaranteed strategies, the correct comparison is between strategies that produce postenactment 
benefits of equal net present value. 
 Yet between tax-guaranteed and tax-contingent benefits of equal net actuarial value, investors 
will not care.  And because they will not care, the tax-guaranteed strategy will induce the same 
amount of enactment-period lobbying as the tax-contingent one.  If so, then the optimal strategy is 
the one that minimizes the social loss from post enactment period lobbying.  The analysis above 
suggests the tax-guaranteed strategy does just that. 
Ramseyer & Nakazato, supra note 48, at 1173 (footnote omitted). 
In Ramseyer and Nakazato’s view, the actual value of the benefit Congress chooses to adopt will 
vary depending on whether Congress adopts a tax-guaranteed or tax-contingent benefit.  Id. To borrow 
an example from Shaviro, if Congress were to adopt a municipal bond tax preference in order encourage 
investment in municipal bonds, it could “fine-tune the preference upon enactment to take account of the 
anticipated transition rule in the event that the preference is later repealed . . . .”  SHAVIRO, supra note 2, 
at 74.  Thus, if Congress intended not to grant transition relief in the event of repeal, it would enact a 
more generous tax benefit than it would if it promised transition relief, “thus keeping the preference’s 
value from being affected by the transition regime.”  Id. at 75.  Assuming such “scaling” occurs, interest 
groups standing to benefit from the tax benefit would be indifferent between the two approaches to 
transition relief in the pre-enactment stage.  Id. at 74–75.  Thus, we would expect that enactment 
lobbying expenditures would not vary according to the transition rule.  However, if Congress later 
decides to repeal the tax benefit, we would expect postenactment expenditures to be greater when 
investors have not been promised transition relief—making the tax-guaranteed strategy preferable to the 
tax-contingent strategy.  Ramseyer & Nakazato, supra note 48, at 1172–73. 
217  Louis Kaplow, Transition Policy: A Conceptual Framework, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 
161, 198–99 (2003). 
218  Id. at 198. 
219  Id.  Kaplow levies this same critique against the argument that transition relief may be necessary 
in order to “reduce[] opposition to desirable reforms.”  Id. at 197.  He explains that consistently 
providing transition relief may merely “buy off . . . opposition to undesirable reforms”—thus making it 
easier for policies that have net social costs to prevail.  Id. at 198. 
220  Id. at 198. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 1626 
increased amount of socially costly legislation, a norm of transition relief 
also leads to more wasteful expenditures ex ante.221  Kaplow argues that 
even if the beneficiaries of the current law are less likely to oppose a change 
to the law when promised transition relief, “[i]t is not obvious that the net 
effect of buying off opposition ex post, when one includes effects of 
undesirable policies ex ante and wasteful rent-seeking expenditures, would 
be positive.”222 
B. How Transition Relief Can Lead to Undesirable Legal Changes and 
Wasteful Lobbying 
In this section, we critique the public choice arguments advanced in 
favor of transition relief and suggest that grandfathering does not 
necessarily bring about desirable legal changes or reduce wasteful lobbying 
expenses.  Specifically, we suggest that the public choice literature 
discussing transition relief pays insufficient attention to the problem that we 
identified in Part IV: transition relief provides existing actors with a 
competitive advantage and thus discourages new actors from entering the 
regulated activity.  When no (or very few) new actors enter the activity, 
there is no one to meet the new, more stringent standards, and thus the 
standards do not have their intended effect.  In addition, because transition 
relief provides existing actors with a competitive advantage, it is not 
necessarily the case that existing actors will spend less money on lobbying 
expenses.  In fact, existing actors may actually engage in lobbying in 
support of the new legislation so they can benefit from stringent regulation 
coupled with generous grandfathering. 
First, in arguing that transition relief is often necessary to pass 
desirable legal changes, the literature ignores how transition relief can 
affect the desirability of the legal changes.  Suppose it is socially desirable 
to require all sources to emit less pollution than they are currently allowed 
to emit.  If existing sources are grandfathered, then these sources are likely 
to stay in operation longer than they otherwise would.  In turn, very few 
new firms, if any, may actually come into existence because they will be at 
a competitive disadvantage compared to those grandfathered existing 
sources.  If there are no new firms to meet the more stringent standards, it 
would be better to maintain the status quo than to pass the more stringent 
regulations coupled with grandfathering.  Indeed, under the status quo, 
inefficient existing sources would gradually be replaced by more efficient, 
and therefore cleaner, new sources.223 
Second, the argument that public choice expenditures are lower at the 
outset when transition relief accompanies proposed legislation is flawed 
 
221  Id. 
222  Id. at 198–99. 
223  See supra notes 183–86 and accompanying text. 
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because it assumes that existing sources are indifferent between the status 
quo on the one hand and new source standards with grandfathering on the 
other, so they do not invest in public choice expenditures to fight such 
standards if grandfathering is provided.  In reality, however, existing 
sources benefit from new source standards with grandfathering because 
such standards impose no costs on existing sources but do impose 
additional costs on new sources, thereby deterring potential competitors 
from entering the market.  Operators of existing sources are thus more 
likely to make public choice expenditures in support of the new source 
standards at the time that the initial program is adopted.  Indeed, industry 
actors have, in fact, lobbied for legislation that ostensibly improves the 
environment when doing so puts them at a competitive advantage.224  Thus, 
it is not clear that grandfathering reduces public choice expenditures at the 
outset when the supposedly desirable legislation is first enacted. 
Third, the argument that transition relief lowers wasteful lobbying 
expenses is flawed because it assumes that once transition relief is granted, 
there will be no additional lobbying expenses in order to extend the 
transition relief.  To use the example discussed by Ramseyer and Nakazato 
to illustrate the common thinking, suppose that Congress adopts a tax credit 
for those taxpayers who invest in solar energy and promises that in the 
event of repeal, the “investors . . . [will be] grandfather[ed] . . . for the life 
of those projects,” or the investors will be paid “a lump sum equal to the net 
present value of the expected, but as-yet-uncollected, tax benefits.”225  Thus, 
if a taxpayer invests in a solar energy project expecting to receive tax 
benefits equaling $1000 over the life of the project, the taxpayer will be 
entitled to this amount regardless of whether the tax credit is later repealed.  
The taxpayer is therefore indifferent about whether the law changes in the 
future.226 
But consider a situation in which the transition relief takes the form of 
limited-time grandfathering, under which the legislation giving rise to the 
legal change specifies that grandfathering will come to an end at a certain 
point.  There is then no reason to believe that existing actors will cease 
lobbying once the initial legislation is adopted, because the benefits of 
grandfathering are ongoing.227  The legislation giving rise to the legal 
change might specify that sources will be required to come into compliance 
with the new regulatory standards after a certain period of time.228  
 
224  See, e.g., ACKERMAN & HASSLER, supra note 82, at 26–54, 117–18 (describing how producers 
of high-sulfur coal lobbied for more stringent regulation of new sources and for standards favoring coal 
scrubbing over low-sulfur coal to secure a competitive advantage over producers of low-sulfur coal). 
225  See Ramseyer & Nakazato, supra note 48, at 1168. 
226  Id. at 1169, 1172. 
227  See Nash & Revesz, supra note 1, at 1729.  For a useful overview of “vintage-differentiated 
regulations” in environmental law, see Stavins, supra note 183, at 30, 36. 
228  The Clean Water Act employs this approach.  See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (2006) (establishing 
timetable for achievement of effluent limitation standards); see also REVESZ, supra note 78, at 507 
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Alternatively, the legislation could require old sources to come into 
compliance with the new regulatory standards when they undergo certain 
modifications,229 as we discuss in detail in Part V.C.  In either event, 
beneficiaries of grandfathering will have incentives to lobby for the purpose 
of extending the time period during which they receive the benefit.  Further, 
if they are successful in obtaining an extension, they will certainly start 
lobbying for an additional extension when the original extension is about to 
expire, a process that may continue indefinitely and greatly increase total 
lobbying expenses. 
C. Lobbying Efforts to Extend Grandfathering Under the Clean Air Act 
In this section, we use the Clean Air Act as a case study to illustrate 
how existing actors lobby extensively for continued grandfathering as the 
existing grandfathering benefit is about to expire.230  Under the Act, existing 
actors were not required to immediately comply with stringent federal new 
source performance standards.231  But once an existing source undergoes a 
“modification” that increases its emissions, the source becomes subject to 
these more stringent standards through a process known as New Source 
Review (NSR).232  Congress’s expectation was that old plants would 
eventually shut down or undergo modifications to upgrade their equipment 
and thereby become subject to the federal standards applying to new 
sources.233  In practice, however, grandfathering bestowed a competitive 
 
(“[T]he [Clean Water Act] adopted a phased approach to the setting of federal standards for existing 
sources, such that EPA was directed to set increasingly stringent effluent limitations for point sources 
over time.”). 
229  The Clean Air Act adopts this approach.  See infra notes 231–32 and accompanying text.  Some 
land use regulations also provide for initial grandfathering, but require grandfathered buildings to 
comply with the new regulations once major modifications are made.  See Shavell, supra note 2, at 75 & 
n.55. 
230  See generally Nash & Revesz, supra note 1 (presenting an economic analysis of transition relief 
through a case study of the Clean Air Act). 
231  42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(2) (2006) (stating that federal performance standards apply to stationary 
sources, “the construction or modification of which is commenced after the publication of regulations”). 
232  “Modification” is defined in the statute as “any physical change in, or change in the method of 
operation of, a stationary source which increases the amount of any air pollutant emitted by such source 
or which results in the emission of any air pollutant not previously emitted.”  Id. § 7411(a)(4).  The 
EPA, however, has promulgated rules exempting from the definition of “modification” certain plant 
changes, including “routine maintenance, repair, and replacement; an increase in production rate, if the 
increase did not exceed the ‘operating design capacity of the affected facility’; an increase in hours of 
operation; and use of alternative fuel or raw material if the affected facility could accommodate such 
use.”  Nash & Revesz, supra note 1, at 1684–85. 
233  See Nash & Revesz, supra note 1, at 1681 (“Commentators regularly note that Congress 
expected most existing sources to gradually phase out over the course of their ordinary economic lives 
or to upgrade and trigger the new source performance standards, leaving most major stationary sources 
subject to federal control.”); David B. Spence, Coal-Fired Power in a Restructured Electricity Market, 
15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 187, 195 (2005) (“Congress does not seem to have intended for 
grandfathered plants to be grandfathered indefinitely, since the [Clean Air] Act calls for application of a 
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advantage on existing sources because they were not subject to the stringent 
new source regulations; these existing sources continued to operate decades 
after the adoption of the new source standards.234 
Absent pollution regulations altogether, an old plant may rationally 
decide to retire its equipment and build a new plant because its old 
equipment will become increasingly inefficient as it begins to degrade.  The 
existence of pollution regulations applying to new sources, however, may 
give the plant an incentive to bear these inefficiencies for longer than it 
otherwise would because doing so would be less costly than complying 
with the standards applicable to new sources.  Of course, eventually the 
equipment becomes so old that modifications triggering the new source 
standards become necessary, but firms have a strong incentive to delay this 
moment as long as possible. 
The Clean Air Act provides a compelling example of this phenomenon.  
In the 1990s, many old plants—including at least twelve utility 
companies—decided to make major modifications without complying with 
the new source review standards as their equipment began to degrade.235  
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed suit on behalf of the EPA 
against nine of these companies in 1999 and 2000.236  These enforcement 
actions were the first to target the coal-fired electric utility industry in the 
more than twenty years since the new source rules had been enacted.237  
 
‘new source’ permitting standards to ‘stationary source[s] the construction or modification of which is 
commenced after’ the effective date of the Act’s new source permitting requirements.” (second 
alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citing § 7411(a)(2))). 
234  Nash & Revesz, supra note 1, at 1708–09 (“[D]ifferential environmental regulations delay plant 
retirement.”); Spence, supra note 233, at 195 (“[O]lder coal-fired power plants, many of them in the 
Midwest, continued to pollute at essentially unregulated rates long after the passage of the [Clean Air] 
Act, depositing acid rain and other pollution on downwind states.”).  Although the acid rain program  
has dramatically reduced total sulfur dioxide emissions from coal-fired power plants, by imposing 
a nationwide cap on emissions, and permitting individual sources to buy and sell emissions 
allowances (tradable permits) . . . [it] does little to solve other pollution problems posed by 
unregulated coal-fired power plants, including those associated with emissions of particulates, 
nitrogen oxides, carbon dioxide and mercury. 
Id. at 197 (footnotes omitted). 
235  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Sues Electric Utilities in Unprecedented Action to 
Enforce the Clean Air Act (Nov. 3, 1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/1999/November/
524enr.htm. 
236  See PUB. CITIZEN, EPA’S SMOKE SCREEN: HOW CONGRESS WAS GIVEN FALSE INFORMATION 
WHILE CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND POLITICAL CONNECTIONS GUTTED A KEY CLEAN AIR RULE 6 
(2003), available at http://www.cleanupwashington.org/documents/epasmokescreen.pdf.  The 
Department of Justice sued nine utility companies: American Electric Power, Cinergy, Duke Energy 
Corp., Illinois Power Co. (Dynegy), FirstEnergy Corp., Southern Co., Southern Indiana Gas & Electric 
Co. (SIGECO), Tampa Electric Co., and the Tennessee Valley Authority.  Id. at 7.  Three other 
companies—Virginia Power (VEPCO), PSEG, and Wisconsin Electric—were threatened with a lawsuit 
but settled.  Id. 
237  Id. at 6. 
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When the first settlements exceeded a total of $3 billion,238 the industry 
quickly began a coordinated lobbying effort to attack these rules. 
Utility companies made substantial campaign contributions during this 
period.  The Edison Electric Institute (EEI), the largest trade association of 
the electric utilities, contributed more than $17 million to federal candidates 
for the 1998, 2000, and 2002 elections.239  In the 2000 presidential 
campaign, executives, employees, and political action committees of the 
electric utility industry gave $4.8 million to George W. Bush’s campaign, 
the Republican National Committee, and the inaugural committee.240  The 
companies facing enforcement action and the EEI contributed over $2 
million of that amount.241  In addition, Thomas Kuhn—the head of the 
EEI—personally contributed over $100,000 to the Bush campaign.242 
When President Bush took office, the Energy Department’s transition 
team included Kuhn and officials from three companies facing NSR 
litigation.243  In addition, Bush appointed Jeffrey Holmstead, who had 
lobbied against NSR on behalf of two clients as the assistant administrator 
for the Office of Air and Radiation (OAR).244  Nine days after taking office, 
Bush created an energy policy task force headed by Vice President Cheney, 
which submitted its recommendations to the President in May 2001.245  The 
group called for a formal review of both the NSR rules and the legal basis 
for the DOJ’s pending enforcement actions.246  With advocates for their 
 
238  Id. 
239  BRANDON WU, U.S. PIRG EDUC. FUND, PAYING TO POLLUTE: CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND 
LOBBYING EXPENDITURES BY POLLUTERS WORKING TO WEAKEN ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS 17 (2004), 
available at http://cdn.publicinterestnetwork.org/assets/PV0eprpcb4arS_TojM2EPA/payingtopollute
2004.pdf. 
240  PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 236, at 3. 
241  See id. at 3, 20. 
242  CHARLES LEWIS, THE BUYING OF THE PRESIDENT 2004: WHO’S REALLY BANKROLLING BUSH 
AND HIS DEMOCRATIC CHALLENGERS—AND WHAT THEY EXPECT IN RETURN 102 (2004).  While the 
industry did give money to the Democrats as well, the lion’s share of the campaign contributions went to 
the Republican Party.  Id. at 101–02 (“The top five electric utility contributors to the political parties in 
the 2000 and 2002 election cycles—Dominion Resources, Inc., Southern Company, Exelon Corporation, 
Texas Utilities Company, and the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association—gave nearly three-
quarters (74 percent) of their party donations, $5.1 million, to the Republican national committees and 
just $1.8 million to the Democrats.”). 
243  PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 236, at 4.  The three officials were Anthony Alexander, president of 
FirstEnergy, Stephen Wakefield, a vice president at Southern Co., and Thomas Farrell, a vice president 
at Dominion.  Id. at 21. 
244  Id. at 4.  The OAR is the arm of the EPA directly responsible for drafting NSR rules, whereas a 
different arm, the Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, primarily serves an enforcement 
role.  See id. at 10–11. 
245  Joel A. Mintz, “Treading Water”: A Preliminary Assessment of EPA Enforcement During the 
Bush II Administration, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 10912, 10918 (2004). 
246  NAT’L ENERGY POLICY DEV. GRP., RELIABLE, AFFORDABLE, AND ENVIRONMENTALLY SOUND 
ENERGY FOR AMERICA’S FUTURE 7–14 (2001), available at http://www.wtrg.com/EnergyReport/
National-Energy-Policy.pdf. 
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cause firmly in place in both the White House and the EPA, the stage was 
set for major policy changes. 
In addition to making campaign contributions, the industry engaged in 
direct forms of lobbying.  Rather than merely relying on its trade 
association, in 2000,247 Southern Company and five other electric utilities 
created a new association, the Electric Reliability Coordinating Council 
(ERCC), to lobby exclusively for NSR changes.248  According to official 
disclosure documents, the ERCC has spent over $8 million pushing for pro-
industry new source rules over the last decade.249  In addition, the EEI spent 
over $49 million on lobbying for this purpose between 1999 and 2002.250 
The industry succeeded in its quest to extend grandfathering when the 
EPA implemented two new rules that made it significantly easier for old 
plants to avoid triggering NSR.  The first rule altered the baseline used to 
determine whether a physical or operational change has resulted in 
increased emissions.251  Recall that only modifications that increase 
emissions trigger NSR.252  Instead of requiring plants to use emissions from 
the last two years as a baseline, the new rule allows plants to “choose any 
consecutive twenty-four month period from the ten years immediately 
preceding the proposed modification.”253  Thus, a plant can pick a period of 
time when its emissions were comparatively high, making it “less likely 
that a plant’s modernization will be found to result in increased 
emissions.”254 
The second rule expanded what would be considered “routine” 
maintenance, which does not count as a “modification,” thereby allowing 
plants to make significant changes without triggering NSR.255  The rule 
 
247  The ERCC filed its first lobbying report with the Senate Office of Public Records (SOPR) for 
the second half of 2000.  See LDA Reports, U.S.  SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/
Public_Disclosure/LDA_reports.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2011). 
248  WU, supra note 239, at 14. 
249  All data taken from LDA Reports, supra note 247 (follow “Search the Lobbying Database (LD-
1, LD-2),” click the box next to “client name” in the new window that opens and click “submit,” type 
“Electric Reliability Coordinating Council” in the field for client name and click “submit,” filter results 
by year by clicking on “Filing Year” in the chart, and add the amounts in the column “Amt Reported” to 
get a total of over $10 million). 
250  See id. (follow “Search the Lobbying Database (LD-1, LD-2),” click the box next to “client 
name” in the new window that opens and click “submit,” type “Edison Electric Institute” in the field for 
client name and click “submit,” filter results by year by clicking on “Filing Year” in the chart, then add 
the amounts in the “Amt Reported” column to reach a total of $74,655,466,000 spent between 1999 and 
2002). 
251  See Nash & Revesz, supra note 1, at 1697–98. 
252  See supra note 232 and accompanying text. 
253  Nash & Revesz, supra note 1, at 1698. 
254  Id. at 1699. 
255  Id. at 1702–03.  Under this rule, three out of the nine utilities sued by the DOJ claimed that they 
were no longer in violation of the Clean Air Act and that the actions should be dropped.  OFFICE OF 
INSPECTOR GEN., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REPORT NO. 2004-P-00034, NEW SOURCE REVIEW RULE 
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provided a safe harbor for changes that cost up to 20% of the replacement 
value of the entire plant.256  Various state governments and environmental 
organizations challenged the 20% rule, arguing that it undermined 
enforcement of the Clean Air Act, and the D.C. Circuit issued a stay on the 
rule, causing the EPA to withdraw it for further consideration.257  In June 
2005, the EPA reissued the rule, leaving it essentially unchanged.258  
Eventually, however, the D.C. Circuit struck down the 20% rule.259 
In summary, while the initial grandfathering under the Clean Air Act 
may have somewhat appeased industry actors—perhaps resulting in less 
overall political opposition to its enactment—it also bestowed a competitive 
advantage upon existing actors that gave them an incentive to lobby to 
extend the grandfathering beyond its expiration date.  Even if the presence 
of a grandfathering provision were to decrease wasteful lobbying when the 
legal change is initially enacted (a proposition that we question in Part 
V.B), additional wasteful lobbying will almost certainly take place when 
the grandfather provision nears expiration. 
CONCLUSION 
Every time a new law is enacted, legislators and regulators must decide 
how to treat actors negatively affected by the legal change.  In the 
environmental context, the question of transition relief will be particularly 
significant when legislation is enacted to respond to the threat of climate 
change.  Indeed, the very efficacy of a new climate change regime may 
depend on the transition policy that is adopted.  While optimal transition 
policy certainly varies depending on the circumstances surrounding the 
legal change, we provide a more nuanced understanding of optimal 
transition relief than has been offered by the academic literature.  In this 
Article, after noting that both proponents and opponents of transition relief 
have paid insufficient attention to certain important issues and after 
considering the long-term effects of grandfathering, we demonstrate the 
flaws of the prevailing approach of first setting a standard for new sources 
without taking existing sources into account and then choosing the best 
transition rule in light of this standard.  Then, we present a novel argument 
for why the joint optimization of these two decisions is preferable to the 
existing sequential approach.  In some cases, our approach would lead to a 
 
CHANGE HARMS EPA’S ABILITY TO ENFORCE AGAINST COAL-FIRED ELECTRIC UTILITIES 21 (2004), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2004/20040930-2004-P-00034.pdf. 
256  See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 255, at 21. 
257  William S.  Eubanks II, The Clean Air Act’s ew Source Review Program: Beneficial to Public 
Health or Merely a Smoke-and-Mirrors Scheme?, 29 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 361, 370 (2009). 
258  Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Non-Attainment New Source Review (NSR): 
Equipment Replacement Provision of the Routine Maintenance, Repair, and Replacement Exclusion: 
Reconsideration, 70 Fed. Reg. 33,838 (June 10, 2005) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51–52). 
259  See New York v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 443 F.3d 880, 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
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less stringent new source standard but no grandfathering for existing 
sources.  In contrast, the sequential approach followed until now in the 
academic literature would choose a less desirable combination: a more 
stringent new source standard coupled with grandfathering.  We also 
critique the public choice justifications for providing transition relief and 
suggest that routinely accompanying new regulations with generous 
transition relief can result in undesirable legal changes and wasteful 
lobbying.  Finally, we show that even in the regulatory context where 
existing actors have made significant investments in order to comply with 
previous regulations, it may still be socially desirable not to provide 
transition relief because a policy of no transition relief encourages existing 
actors to anticipate socially desirable regulatory changes. 
While this Article focuses on command-and-control regulation—
largely because command-and-control regulation still dominates the 
regulatory field—it is important to acknowledge that many of the 
difficulties associated with optimal transition relief in a command-and-
control regime are avoided under a cap-and-trade or tax system.  While 
most discussion of cap-and-trade and tax schemes has focused on their cost-
minimizing properties,260 these schemes are also advantageous in that they 
provide an optimal mechanism for transitioning from existing sources to 
new sources.  Indeed, under a cap-and-trade or tax system, an old plant that 
is no longer operating efficiently must either close its doors and sell its 
permits to a new plant or develop more efficient pollution-reduction 
techniques.  Thus, there is no need for regulators to craft separate standards 













260  See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. 
L. REV. 1333, 1341–42 (1985) (“A system of tradeable rights will tend to bring about a least-cost 
allocation of control burdens, saving many billions of dollars annually.”); Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. 
Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation: A ew Era from an Old Idea?, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
1, 7–8 (1991) (“In contrast to traditional command-and-control approaches, policy mechanisms based on 
economic incentive systems ensure that firms ‘automatically’ undertake pollution control efforts in 
precisely the manner and degree which will result in the cost-effective allocation of the overall control 
burden.” (footnote omitted)). 
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